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Drug trafficking organizations have increased their prominence throughout the 
Caribbean and Central America. These organizations undermine the rule of law, increase 
levels of violence and corruption, and hamper development, all of which can weaken a 
state. Weak or failing states become domestic and regional burdens that spill over into 
neighboring countries and cause secondary and tertiary problems. This thesis examines 
causes for different state capacities in the Caribbean and Central America through case 
study comparisons between Haiti, the Bahamas, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. The varying 
state capacities’ interaction with similar drug trafficking pressures accounts for different 
state legitimacy statuses. Haiti’s institutional and ideological influences account for its 
low state capacity (SC) as compared to the Bahamas. Policy decisions to improve 
security forces’ (SECFOR) state capacity and cooperate with U.S. counternarcotic 
operations result in the Bahamas’ higher SC. Nicaragua and Guatemala’s transitions to 
democracy have resulted in different SECFOR capacities. Nicaragua chose to improve its 
SECFOR and currently receives assistance from the United States to combat drug 
trafficking. In contrast, Guatemala institutionalized a corrupt and ineffective SECFOR 
during its transition to peace. Both regional comparisons prove that SC is a choice. 
Understanding this relationship can guide domestic and international policy incentives or 
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The global drug trade is a multi-billion dollar a year industry. Roughly 162 to 324 
million people consume illicit drugs (of the cannabis, opioid, cocaine, or amphetamine 
classifications), which corresponds to 3.5–7 percent of the world population.1 The sale of 
narcotics is a lucrative business in which success leads to exponential profits in 
comparison to the costs of production. For example, cocaine consumers in North America 
(50 percent) and European Union countries (25 percent) accounted for 75 percent of the 
world’s cocaine use in 2012. The estimated value of the cocaine trade in these areas is 88 
billion dollars.2 Profit incentives alone account for the manner in which drug trafficking 
organizations (DTOs) seek to weaken state capacity in order to operate with relative 
impunity and without fear of incarceration.  
Since the 1970s, DTOs have increased their prominence throughout the Caribbean 
and Central America. Far from benign, these organizations undermine the rule of law, 
increase levels of violence and corruption, and hamper development. This thesis asks the 
question: how does drug trafficking pressure (DTP) and state capacity (SC) explain 
variations of state legitimacy (SL)? In this thesis, I argue that DTP has a negative impact 
on SL, while SC has a positive impact on SL. That is, when DTP increases, SL decreases 
if SC is unable to combat the negative DTP impacts. Low SL is reflective of overall weak 
states and can bring numerous consequences to its population and neighboring countries. 
The significance of the research question is that it can identify the causes for 
different levels of state legitimacy. Once the causes are identified, policy efforts can 
focus on restoring a state’s political, economic, and social capacity so that the negative 
DTP impacts can be alleviated.  
This study looks at the interaction of key variables related to a state’s legitimacy. 
Next, it discusses the theory in relation to the variables to formulate a hypothesis 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2014 (New York: United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014), accessed March 7, 2016, https://www.unodc.org/wdr2014/en/drug-
use.html.  
2 Ibid.  
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regarding state legitimacy. Furthermore, alternative hypotheses account for differences in 
SC resulting in varying SL. Last, the hypothesis is used to explain different state 
legitimacies in the Caribbean and Central America after the entrance of DTOs into the 
region.  
A. THE VARIABLES 
This section reviews the literature that defines the independent and dependent 
variables related to a state’s legitimacy. The first variable is state capacity as defined by 
different schools of thought. The next section describes tools used to measure SC. Third, 
a state model describes elements of a state that helps to identify areas that can result in 
different SC levels and the relationship between those elements and DTPs. The fourth 
section describes the result of low SC in weak or failing states and the importance of 
identifying them. The next section discusses the variable DTPs and its effects on the state 
the economic, political, and social realms. The last section defines SL and discusses its 
measurements.  
1. INDEPENDENT VARIABE 1: STATE CAPACITY 
State capacity (SC) is inherently related to a state’s strength and can be defined in 
many ways. Measuring SC is crucial to determine whether or not DTO activities have an 
effect on SL. If SC is high, hypothesize that the effects of drug trafficking should be low, 
which means low crime rates, violence, and corruption levels. Therefore, state capacity 
that can combat the effects of DTPs should have a better SL status.  
There are two schools of thought for measuring governance, also known as state 
capacity (SC). Fukuyama’s school of thought measures how government functions, and 
the other, advanced by Rotberg, measures government outputs. Francis Fukuyama 
measures capacity according to “Weberian Bureaucracy.”3 He assesses quality of 
governance based on how government functions.  
                                                 
3 Weber favored a government dominated by a strong bureaucracy that can limit a government’s 
political powers and corruption while allowing the market to function freely. Weber’s bureaucrats are 
impersonal, consummate professionals who operate without emotion and simply execute their assigned 
duties within the rules and regulations of their billets. “Max Weber and State Bureaucracy,” College Term 
Papers, accessed March 7, 2016, https://www.collegetermpapers.com/viewpaper/1304082234.html. 
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Fukuyama’s four measurements for governance capacity and quality are 
procedural, input, output, and autonomy.4 Procedural assessments focus on the way 
government administrators operate. For example, career progression procedures is the 
key focus of the evaluation of the quality of rules, regulations, and hierarchy. If a 
bureaucracy promotes based on personal favors or political patronage instead of technical 
proficiency, then there is room for corruption.5 Next, governments that are too 
bureaucratic, or have “too much red tape,” experience problems. For example, a highly 
bureaucratic government that operates with strict adherence to procedures can be highly 
inefficient and slow to act as compared to one that can execute directives from one 
person.6 Moreover, capacity measures the ability of the government to produce expected 
outputs. Fukuyama uses tax extraction as the litmus test for a state’s capacity and 
government quality. If a state is able to effectively and efficiently collect taxes, then the 
revenue generation can lead to provision of other public goods.7 Furthermore, capacity 
can be measured in terms of professionalization of government officials. Bureaucratic 
positions that have career potential with high standards increase capacity levels for 
governments.  
The next measurement in Fukuyama’s approach is output. Output looks at the 
performance of the bureaucracy in relation to society’s expectations; however, output 
measurements do not take into account the impact that society has on the manner and 
                                                 
4 Francis Fukuyama, “What is Governance?” (Working Paper 314, Center for Global Development, 
Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA, 2013), 
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1426906_file_Fukuyama_What_Is_Governance.pdf, 5.  
5 Ibid., 6.  
6 The U.S. acquisitions and procurement process regarding military equipment programs is highly 
inefficient due to procedures and lack of capacity to remain relevant. For example, the U.S. spent $3 billion 
on the USMC Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) Program, with an anticipated $14.4 billion to produce 
1,000 vehicles. The development of the EFV program began in the 1980s and was cancelled in January 
2011. Christopher Drew, “Pentagon is Poised to Cancel Marine Landing Craft,” New York Times, January 
5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/06/business/06marine.html?_r=0.  
7 Ibid., 7. 
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way in which the government functions.8 For example, an organized and bureaucratically 
resistant population can limit state capacity.9  
The last governance measurement is autonomy. Autonomy relates to the ability of 
the bureaucracy to carry out mandates set by the political principal. Autonomy is 
inversely related to the number of mandates.10 An ideal balance allows for a manageable 
amount of mandates to be executed without overbearing micromanagement. In the end, 
Fukuyama argues that extractive capacity (tax collection) and autonomy are the best ways 
to measure government quality.11 If a bureaucracy has adequate capacity and 
competence, then more autonomy allows it to produce desirable outputs. On the contrary, 
inadequate capacity necessitates less autonomy and more direction from the political 
principal.12 Fukuyama argues, “quality of governance is ultimately a function of the 
interaction of capacity and autonomy.”13 The kind of metrics required to effectively 
measure qualities of governance with Fukuyama’s pitch is a data-collecting nightmare. 
He even admits this about his approach and recommends more simplified criteria for 
assessing governance.14 The next method for evaluating state capacity provides more 
tangible and quantifiable data.  
Robert I. Rotberg’s evaluation of state capacity measures tangible aspects of 
governance that provides clear statistical analysis. The statistics can be used to assess 
trends that may signal weakening of a state or deterioration of its sovereignty. For 
example, looking at infrastructure data such as miles of roads, telecommunications 
coverage, electric power, and healthcare provisions are some categories that provide 
tangible metrics to measure state capacity. These metrics can be used in conjunction with 
additional SC indicators to determine state strength, such as the fragile states index (FSI) 
                                                 
8 Fukuyama, “What is Governance?,” 9.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid., 10–11.  
11 Ibid., 6.  
12 Ibid., 13.  
13 Ibid., 16.  
14 Ibid.  
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and World Bank governance aggregates. States with low public goods outputs (e.g., 
infrastructure), low governance ratings, and in a fragile or failing category according to 
the FSI are more vulnerable to the effects of DTO activities.  
2. Measuring State Capacity  
There are many ways to measure SC. The first is the World Bank’s aggregate 
governance indicators, which provides a metric to measure governance SC. According to 
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, governance is,  
the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. 
This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens 
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions among them.15  
These three elements of governance are then broken down into six measurable indicators, 
two for each element, which assist with assessing the strength of a particular country’s 
aggregate governance.  
According to World Bank 2014 governance rankings for 206 countries, Haiti 
ranks 186th out of 206 countries measured.16 Additionally, also according to the 2014 
rankings, three out of the four Central American countries rank in the fourth quintile: 
Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. The next quintile contains Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, and Jamaica. Last, the second quintile contains the Bahamas, 
which ranks 43rd out of 206 with a 76.25 percent average governance rank.  
The ranking of aggregate governance indicators provides insight into the ability of 
a state to provide adequate levels of public goods. Combining tangible aspects from 
Rotberg’s definition of a state’s strength with a state’s perceived governance rankings 
allows for a more thorough indication of a state’s overall strength. These aspects also 
                                                 
15 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Mssimo Mastruzzi, The Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues (World Bank Policy Research working paper no. 5430, World Bank 
Institute, Washington, DC, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130, 6. 
16 “World Bank Governance Indicators,” World Bank, accessed June 4, 2016, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators.  
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help to explain secondary and tertiary effects when internal and external pressures weigh 
on strained areas of a state’s governance structure. State strength data allows for policy 
makers to develop agendas that can target weaker aspects of a country’s governance in 
order to prevent the state from failing.17  
The next SC measurement involves security forces. Security forces’ [SECFOR 
(i.e., military and police)] rates can be used to assess SC and its effectiveness. SECFOR 
rates are the numbers of police officers or military personnel per 100,000 citizens. 
Theoretically, more SECFOR personnel per citizens (higher rate) should result in higher 
SC. That is, as SC in terms of SECFOR increases, dependent variables representative of 
SL, such as homicide, corruption, and clearance rates, should be affected. For example, 
high state capacity for SECFOR should result in lower homicide and corruption rates, 
while clearance rates increase. The dependent variables are a good indicator of SECFOR 
effectiveness. SECFOR SC is the institutional capacity of the security forces; both police 
and the military. If lower SECFOR rates in a country result in positive effects on crime, 
corruption, and clearance rates, then SECFOR SC is more effective than a country with 
higher SECFOR rates. This thesis uses both the World Bank’s governance indicators and 
SECFOR rates to measure SC in the Caribbean and Central America.  
3. The Structure of the State  
The structural components of a state provide a framework that illustrates areas 
where SC can differ between states. Barry Buzan’s state model provides three 
components representing the realms for state capacity (political, economic, and social). 
The three components are represented by a triangle. The idea of the state is at the top, 
with the institutions and the physical base of the state as the legs.18 The first two legs 
(idea and institutions) of the model can assist with identifying SC levels (high/low), while 
the third leg (base) depicts the relationship between SC and DTPs (see Figure 1).  
                                                 
17 “Failed States Index 2014: The Book,” Funds for Peace, 9, http://library.fundforpeace.org/cfsir1423, 
9.  
18 Johan Engvall, “The State under Siege: The Drug Trade and Organised Crime in Tajikistan,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 58, no. 6 (2006): 831.   
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Figure 1.  Buzan’s State Model19 
The idea of the state relates to two things: national identity and ideology. National 
identity is used to justify the existence of the state as representing the “will of the 
people.” Ideology helps to define the state’s political identity, and it assists in organizing 
institutions that give the idea structure.20 The ideology is used as the foundation for the 
state’s political and economic structure, which is encapsulated by its institutions. 
According to Buzan,  
In a properly constituted state, one should expect to find a distinctive idea 
of some sort which lies at the heart of the state’s political identity. What 
does the state exist to do? Why is it there? What is its relation to the 
society it contains?21  
                                                 
19 Source: Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, Trying to Make Sense of the Contemporary Debate on State-
Building: The Legitimacy and the Institutional Approaches on State, State Collapse and State-Building 
(Ottawa: Center for International Policy Studies, University of Ottawa, 2010), 
http://eprints.bham.ac.uk/829/1/PSA_-_Trying_the_Make_Sense.pdf, 9.  
20 Barry Buzan, People States & Fear (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 80.  
21 Ibid., 70.  
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Comparing different ideologies can confirm or deny causes of weak SC in the selected 
case studies. For example, Haiti’s political ideology could differ from that of the 
Bahamas and may serve as a cause of weakness in the state’s apparatus.  
Institutions are the tangible elements of the state that carry out the necessary 
functions designed to make it operate politically and economically. They include all 
branches of government and the laws that dictate how each will operate.22 Institutions 
take the ideas of the state and put them into action.23 Problems arise when the idea of the 
state is weak, and the institutions take on all functions of the state.24 In this situation, 
those in power use the institutional state capacity to fulfill the ruling elites’ self-interests, 
and they also use force to ensure coherence of and obedience to established rules.25 
According to Buzan, the Duvalier regime in Haiti is a fitting example of a state whose 
ideas were weak and the coercive institutional capacity was used to replace them.26  
The last leg of the state model is the physical base (See Figure 1). The physical 
base includes the population and territory of the state. These entities are more definitive 
and tangible with regard to a sovereign state being under siege, because the effects on its 
people, property, and institutions are visible. For example, it is easier to identify the 
effects of DTPs by examining violence, corruption, and drug trafficking levels than to 
measure DTP impacts on institutions or the state’s ideology. Furthermore, the effects of 
drug use on the population are quantifiable through social aspects, such as numbers of 
drug addicts, disease trends, and migration patterns (e.g., brain drain). Territorial threats 
to the state come in the form of alternate sources of force. For instance, criminal 
organizations, such as DTOs, are able to challenge the institutional SECFOR when the 
state weakens. Any weakening of institutions in the political and economic realms allows 
opportunities for DTOs to press their advantage. When the state weakens, DTOs use 
violence to ensure that corruption continues, the population becomes weary of political 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 83.  
23 Engvall, “State under Siege,” 833.  
24 Buzan, People States & Fear, 83.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Ibid.  
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protest, and the legitimacy of the government is questioned internally and externally. The 
next section discusses weak or failing states and their potential impacts on SC.  
4. Failing States  
A failed or weak state has many characteristics that identify internal problems 
indicative of low SC. First, failed states can experience open conflict, wherein two or 
more insurgencies exist and the insurgents direct dissent to the state. Also, failed states 
can be determined by an enduring nature of violence, which is not limited to the intensity 
of that violence.27 This longevity of violence versus its intensity is the metric used to 
determine whether or not a state is failing. Moreover, failed states cannot control their 
peripheral borders. There are lawless areas in which non-state actors, such as DTOs, 
terrorist groups, and insurgents become prevalent.28 Last, failed states have flawed 
institutions, lack infrastructural capacity (potholes), have poor, privatized education and 
medical systems, all of which further disenfranchises the public, “unparalleled economic 
opportunity for the elite and select few,” corruption flourishes, declining gross domestic 
product (GDP) and an increasing GINI index.29 The GINI index is a measurement of the 
income distribution between the rich and poor for a country’s population. 
According to Robert I. Rotberg, “A failed state is a country with a government 
that cannot or will not deliver essential political goods (public services) to its citizens.”30 
The levels of effective delivery of public goods determine the differences between strong 
and weak states and weak from failed or collapsed states.31 Furthermore, there is a 
hierarchy of political goods: security, laws, and political participation. “Thus, failed 
states are those political entities in international politics that supply deficient qualities and 
quantities of political goods and, simultaneously, no longer exercise a monopoly of 
                                                 
27 Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), 5.  
28 Ibid., 6.  
29 Ibid., 8.  
30 Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States: A Paradigm Revived,” Africa and Asia: The Key Issues (blog), 
March 12, 2014, https://robertrotberg.wordpress.com/2014/03/12/failed-states-a-paradigm-revived/, 3.  
31 Rotberg, When States Fail, 2.  
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violence within their territories.”32 Rotberg also says weak states, “ignore their 
obligations to their citizens, and they fail to provide the essential societal glue of security 
that makes their citizens safe.”33  
Without adequate security, a state will struggle to maintain a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force, which threatens the existence of the state. Rotberg proposed 
several metrics to determine the strength of a state based on its provision of public goods. 
Examples of metric include “miles of paved roads per capita, life expectancy and 
maternal mortality rates, literacy and educational persistence data, GDPs per capita, 
voting rates, and the numbers of people killed in the throe of civil combat.”34 A 
comparison of the metrics for Haiti and the Bahamas, combined with the governance 
indicators, can determine the strength levels of those states so that an assessment can be 
made for how DTPs influence SL.  
5. Importance of Identifying Weak States 
Failing states are important to identify because they are vulnerable to DTPs’ 
negative effects. In addition, failing states often have low SL as a result of ineffective SC. 
DTOs take advantage of decreased SC in order to conduct their illicit activities. It is 
important to identify weakening states so that decisions can be made to increase state 
capacity and deter DTO activities from occurring.  
Weak states have a plethora of problems associated with them. First, weak states 
can serve as a breeding ground or training incubator for terrorist organizations. 
According to Anthony Cordesman, “the concentration of terrorist violence can often be 
directly linked to major civil conflicts and failed nations that have weak and corrupt 
governments and deep sectarian, ethnic, racial, and tribal friction.”35 Additionally, weak 
states usually lack the institutional capacity to combat or prevent terrorist organizations 
                                                 
32 Rotberg, “Failed States,” 3. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Rotberg, When States Fail, 3.  
35 Anthony H. Cordesman, Broad Patterns in Global Terrorism in 2014 (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, 2015), 
http://csis.org/files/publication/150618_Patterns_in_Global_Terrorism_in_2014.pdf, 1.  
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from developing within their borders. According to the New York Times, “Failed states 
that cannot provide jobs and food for their people, that have lost chunks of territory to 
warlords, and that can no longer track or control their borders send an invitation to 
terrorists.”36 Therefore, due to ineffectual enforcement of the rule of law or 
counterterrorism efforts, terrorist organizations view weak states as ideal locations in 
which to recruit, train, plan, and execute their agendas.37  
In the Western Hemisphere, most countries acknowledge the potential threat that 
terrorism brings; however, they view transnational criminal organizations as a higher 
threat in areas where “corruption, weak government institutions, insufficient interagency 
cooperation, poor legislation, and a lack of resources” are prevalent.38 These 
characteristics are common in the Caribbean and Central American countries under 
review in this thesis.  
Although terrorist related incidents are low in the Western Hemisphere (less than 
1,000 from 1970–2001) as compared to the rest of the world, there is potential for such 
organizations to infiltrate the fabrics of the weakened states in Latin America. From 1970 
to 2001, there have only been 11 reported terrorist acts in Latin America, compared to 11 
in the United States. The Global Terrorism Database does not include the 2009 Ft. Hood 
attacks, the 2013 Boston Bombing, the 2015 Marine Drill Center Attack in Tennessee, or 
the 2015 San Bernardino massacre in the U.S.39  
The next problem associated with weak states is the proliferation of small-arms 
weapons. In Latin America, there are roughly one to two million weapons in circulation 
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throughout the region.40 In a region that is composed of several developing countries and 
weak states, the presence of so many weapons has negative consequences. Weak states 
are usually the source for making, distributing, or shipping small arms.41 According to 
the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey (SAS) in 2015, the proliferation of small arms has 
significant impacts on the development of countries. The SAS reports, “Armed violence 
can trigger forced displacement, erode social capital, and destroy infrastructure.”42 In 
addition, armed violence and transnational crime are mutually supportive activities that 
lead to increased trafficking of drugs, persons, corruption, and violence.43 The risk 
factors associated with underdevelopment and armed violence are as follows: “weak 
institutions, economic inequality, exclusion of minority groups, unequal gender relations, 
limited education opportunities, persistent unemployment, organized crime (OC), and the 
availability of firearms and drugs.”44 Thus, the combination of weak states and weapons 
result in several secondary and tertiary effects that make recovery difficult.  
Furthermore, weak states attract transnational criminal organizations that are 
drawn to the perceived lawlessness or lack of enforcement capacity within their borders. 
In this environment, criminal organizations can operate with a level of impunity 
supported by rampant corruption, violence, high inequality, and low law enforcement 
capabilities. Countries in the Caribbean and Central America have served as hosts to the 
prolific drug trafficking shipment routes that take advantage of those countries’ 
weaknesses. There is an inverse relationship between the power of the state and the 
power of the DTOs. When the state is weak, the DTOs become stronger as they are able 
to ship more illicit materials and thereby make more money that is used to purchase 
protection in the forms of weapons and bribery of key public officials. This relationship 
is discussed in further detail when looking at the increased capacity of the Caribbean 
                                                 
40 Julie Marie Bunk and Michael Ross Fowler, Bribes Bullets and Intimidation: Drug Trafficking and 
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41 Patrick, “Weak States,” 18.  
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http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/by-region/americas.html#c2088.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid.  
 13 
states to combat DTOs and the shift of the drug trafficking supply routes through Central 
America where the states were weaker.  
Last, weak states have a tendency to cause spillover effects to their neighbors and 
the region as a whole.45 According to Max Manwaring, weak states lead to:  
human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, 
trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and 
weapons of mass destruction, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and 
criminal anarchy.46  
Weak states typically have porous borders and allow their internal problems to 
leak into the surrounding area. For instance, the mass migration of Central American 
unaccompanied children (UAC) rose 90 percent from 2013 to 2014.47 During the spring 
and summer of 2014, record levels of UAC jumped to 27,000 but then rapidly dropped 
three months later only to rise again in 2015.48 The migration patterns demonstrate two 
things: first, when the collective efforts of Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries 
(Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) took steps to secure their borders, the numbers 
of UAC migrations dropped rapidly. Second, despite the increased state measures to deter 
migrations, there are still underlying factors that overpower state efforts to stop 
migrations.49  
These underlying factors include high levels of violence; the Northern Triangle 
states have the highest murder rates in the world.50 Furthermore, economic conditions 
continue to cause high poverty levels that are exacerbated by severe droughts. The 
droughts are destined to cause significant food shortages, which could be the trigger for 
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49 Ibid., 3. 
50 Ibid.  
 14 
increased social unrest against a backdrop of political instability.51 For example, in the 
Northern Triangle, two former presidents and the current president of Guatemala were 
charged with corruption crimes in 2015; this caused further weakening of and instability 
in the government.52 The political instability debilitates the government’s willingness or 
ability to respond to the growing crises in the region. 
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: DRUG TRAFFICKING PRESSURES  
Drug trafficking pressures (DTPs) affect state legitimacy in many ways. Chiefly, 
they affect the economic, political, and social realms.53 In many examples throughout the 
world, DTOs serve as a parallel authority to the central government within the same 
border.54 DTOs are able to fill this role due to the ability to rapidly gain capital through 
illegal means, which allows them to create secondary political, economic, and security 
frameworks.55 These frameworks are on the periphery where state capacity is lacking. 
Essentially, where state capacity is weak, DTOs can operate and strengthen their 
operations through corruption and violence, such as happened in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan in the mid-1990s to 2005.56 In this context, drug trafficking and illicit 
activities are a function of opportunism.  
The case examples in the former Soviet states of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Colombia show an indirect relationship wherein low economic SC created opportunities 
for DTOs to flourish. When the Soviet economy collapsed, rural areas were hit the 
hardest, as agricultural subsidies no longer existed. According to Marat, “The 
governments’ inability to provide sufficient welfare to an impoverished rural population 
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55 Ibid., 93–94.  
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and geographical proximity to Afghanistan created possibilities for fast accumulation of 
private capital from illicit businesses, including drug trafficking.”57 The result was a 
secondary illicit economy that fueled power aspirations of DTOs to corrupt and control 
the political legitimacy of the state.58 According to Francisco Thoumi, in Colombia “the 
drug trade has in fact weakened the country's economy by fostering violence and 
corruption, undermining legal activity, frightening off foreign investment, and all but 
destroying the social fabric.”59 Nazih Richani argues that neo-liberal economic policies 
in Central America (El Salvador and Guatemala specifically) weakened the state, and 
DTOs took advantage of the situation.60 The cliché “money talks and nonsense walks” 
came to fruition as the rural neo-businessmen (criminals) used their wealth to purchase 
political power.61  
1. Economic Realm of DTO Pressure 
States with low development and high poverty are more susceptible to the 
secondary economy’s influences. For example, the dire Soviet economy encouraged the 
black market, where both government officials and criminals benefited through the 
informal economic structure.62 DTOs gained legitimacy by providing an economic and 
social welfare to the impoverished population, therefore propelling the continued 
weakening of the state.  
Some have argued the second economy is a subversive force that can lead to state 
failure. On the contrary, the second economy illustrates the role DTOs can play through 
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balancing inefficiencies and shortfalls in state capacity.63 Patrick Meehan makes the 
argument that in the case of Burma, drug trafficking actually has created an environment 
that can lead to increased SC. Meehan argues, “the drug trade has provided the state with 
an array of incentives (legal impunity, protection, money laundering) and threats (of 
prosecution) with which to co-opt and coerce insurgent groups over which it has 
otherwise commanded little authority.”64 In this sense, corruption and blackmail are the 
foundations of the state’s ability to gain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and to 
use its institutional capabilities to tax the population.65 Therefore, DTOs are not seeking 
to overthrow governments, but they are attempting to leverage economic state capacity 
deficiencies in their favor.  
2. Political Realm of DTO Pressure 
The effects that DTOs have on a state’s political legitimacy are inherently linked 
to the secondary economy (i.e., black market). DTOs use the monetary power gained 
through the illicit markets to corrupt government officials and gain access to the state’s 
political realm. Corruption targets law enforcement agents, legal representatives, political 
positions, and any other state institution in which a bribe can be advantageous to DTO 
activities.66 DTOs use corruption to bribe government officials in order to solidify state 
political influence through local elections.67 Once criminal organizations are involved 
with politics, the state’s ability to combat criminal activities is further weakened. Corrupt 
politicians are known to use the authority of the state for their own self-interests.68 For 
example, the head of a Kyrgyz parliamentary committee on organized crime from 2000–
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2005 was a renowned gangster.69 Another example is Pablo Escobar’s election to 
Colombia’s house of representatives in 1982.70  
Additional literature looks at the relationship between states and DTPs. For 
example, researchers conducted an analysis on SC and its effect on drug trafficking by 
comparing Ghana and Guinea-Bissau in West Africa. According to the World Bank’s 
Country Performance Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Quality of Public Administration 
indicators, Ghana’s SC was higher than Guinea-Bissau’s in 2005. Ghana’s higher SC 
resulted in more drug seizures than in neighboring Guinea-Bissau.71 Some scholars 
postulate that interdiction efforts have failed because the more governments try to 
interdict supplies, the more profits stabilize or increase, and this keeps the incentive high 
actually encouraging trafficking instead of deterring it.72 In addition, supply-based 
counternarcotic efforts can lead to multiple secondary and tertiary effects. For instance, 
Phillip Coffin and Jeremy Bigwood claim that the current U.S. drug policies result in 
human rights violations, support of nondemocratic regimes, fosters an image of the U.S. 
as a bullying hypocrite, and leads to environmental damage caused by eradication 
efforts.73  
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3. Social Realm of DTO Pressure 
Last, the social ills associated with drug trafficking result in increased violence, 
addiction, disease, and strains on the security and judicial state institutions. Violence is 
the metric largely associated with increasing DTO activities; however, several scholars 
equate increases in violence to other variables. For example, Jennifer Holmes makes the 
argument that violence in Colombia is not due specifically to coca production, but it is 
due to economic factors and coca eradication efforts.74 Furthermore, several scholars 
argue that violence is not tied specifically to coca production but to a myriad of SC 
issues, including political, economic, and human capital issues. For example, inequality 
and violence are directly related (i.e., inequality goes up as violence goes up); however, 
when human capital variables, such as “conditions of life, GINI index, and levels of 
education” are considered, there is an inverse relationship.75  
Finally, some scholars link increasing levels of violence to drug enforcement 
policies. According to Horace A. Bartilow, “Drug enforcement and violent crime in Latin 
America are endogenously related.”76 He claims the rise in violence in Latin America is a 
result of increased U.S. drug enforcement policies related to U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) interdiction and trafficker immobilization operations.77 In contrast, other 
scholars focus on the relationship between SC and violence. For instance, Nazih Richani 
supports the inverse relationship between SC and violence levels (i.e., as SC goes down, 
violence goes up). According to Nazih Richani, decreased SC leads to a “systemic 
relationship interlocking states’ agents and criminal organizations in a modality that 
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perpetuates high rates of homicides.”78 This thesis argues that increasing DTPs combined 
with low SC will result in higher violence rates.  
C. DEPENDENT VARIABLE: STATE LEGITIMACY 
My dependent variable is state legitimacy. State legitimacy (SL) is a perception 
based on the resulting interaction between the independent variables (IVs) SC and DTP. 
There are several factors that influence a population’s perception of SL. First, the 
strength of the SC affects the populations’ perception of SL. Second, a state’s national 
identity and heritage influences SL. 
Legitimacy is both vertical and horizontal and directly related to a state’s strength. 
Vertical legitimacy refers to the population’s acceptance of the state’s rule over them.79 
According to Ohlson and Soderberg, “vertical legitimacy establishes the 
connection…between society and political institutions and regimes.”80 When vertical 
legitimacy is low, social mobilization may occur to reestablish an agreed upon right to 
rule.81 Horizontal legitimacy refers to the interactions of different groups within society, 
political participation of these groups, and their ability to accept and tolerate each other.82 
When tolerance and participation is high, then horizontal legitimacy is high.83 There will 
be a legitimacy gap when a difference occurs between expectations of what the 
government is supposed to provide, according to the social contract, and what the state is 
willing to provide.84  
Understanding the nature of the state and its national identity can help determine 
the legitimacy of a state. For example, patrimonialism in post-colonial states creates 
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legitimacy issues. Legitimacy is questionable in these weakened states because it is based 
on the patrimonial network of its leaders.85 People who are not part of this network 
become disenfranchised as the state’s interests are indistinguishable from those of the 
elites in power.86 Patrimonialism has plagued the institutional capacities of states in Latin 
America, particularly Haiti, as those in power are focused on their short-term survival 
instead of long-term growth and development of the country. The ideological and 
institutional weaknesses of patrimonial states forces leaders to focus on simply 
maintaining legitimacy through their patron-client networks instead of “constructing 
national identities, creating legitimacy, and providing security and other services” 
through the provision of public goods (social contract).87  
I will be measuring SL according to how the case study countries’ populations 
perceive certain variables according to in-country surveys. The Latin American Public 
Opinion Surveys (LAPOP) quantify SL measured by support for stable democracy, 
corruption, and perception of physical security. These variables account for different 
nuances in both the vertical and horizontal realms referred to by Soderberg.  
The literature provides methods to measure SC and its ability to combat the 
negative effects of DTPs on SL. In addition, the governance indicators and SECFOR 
rates provide SC measurements whose effectiveness can predict whether SL will be low 
or high when facing increasing DTPs. The dependent variables of crime, corruption, and 
clearance rates are assessed through regional comparisons in the Caribbean and Central 
America.  
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D. THEORY 
Table 1 depicts the relationship between different DTPs and SC levels and the 
corresponding SL statuses.  






  Low High 
STATE 







DTP has a negative impact on SL, while SC has a positive impact on SL. That is, 
when DTP increases, SL decreases if SC is unable to combat the negative DTP impacts. 
Two variables affect SL: DTPs and SC. DTP and SC are the independent variables (IVs), 
while SL is the dependent variable (DV). The equation DTP+SC=SL provides four state 
statuses in regard to SL. First, when DTP and SC is low, SL status is vulnerable. Second, 
when there is high DTP and low SC, SL status is a narco-state. Third, when there is low 
DTP and high SC, SL status is a stable state. Fourth, when DTP and SC is high, SL status 
is a state under siege.  
A vulnerable state lacks certain state capabilities to provide public goods. For 
example, law enforcement and rule of law capacity will struggle to prevent or prosecute 
criminal activity. The country suffers from high crime rates and low conviction rates. 
Further, infrastructural problems persist with inadequate transportation and 
communication networks. These circumstances are a cause for, or result of poor 
economic conditions. Last, corruption rates are high. Increasing DTPs will push a 
vulnerable state into a narco-state, which shares the same characteristics. A stable state 
provides public goods for its citizens through reliable security forces, proper 
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infrastructure that encourages economic growth and development, and rule of law. The 
public can expect police officers to apprehend criminals, the judicial system to prosecute 
and convict the guilty, which leads to lower levels of systemic corruption. A state under 
siege has the same characteristics, except it faces higher DTPs. Its SC levels are lower 
than a stable state’s, although it is able to maintain current levels. A stalemate occurs 
with the state’s ability to combat DTPs until SC improves or foreign assistance arrives. 
Viewed as a spectrum, SL status from low to high can be measured according to survey 
criteria percentages. For example, SL percentages broken into quarter percentiles are as 
follows:  
• 0–25% = narco-state,  
• 26–50% = state under siege,  
• 51–75% = vulnerable state, and  
• 76–100% = stable state.  
The difference between a state under siege and vulnerable state is the presence of DTPs, 
and it can quickly take a turn for the worse. 
In addition, U.S. influence is relevant for improved SC and decreasing DTO 
activities in a region. It is relevant because it provides technical and economic assistance 
in developing domestic institutions resulting in a better SL status.  
E. ALTERNATE HYPOTHESES  
There are several alternate hypotheses that could explain the variation of SL apart 
from the two I am studying. The first is cultural influences. A country’s culture, or 
colonial heritage, could explain different corruption levels. For example, English colonies 
tend to be less corrupt than Spanish colonies because Spanish conquistadores’ 
patrimonial institutional effects are the root cause of customary corruption in Latin 
America, while the English colonies’ tended to implant institutions based on rule of law. 
Thus, if a country is a former Spanish colony, then it is more likely to be more corrupt, 
which opens avenues for DTPs’ negative impacts on SL. Corruption is a result of low SC 
failing to combat the effects of DTPs. 
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The second alternate hypothesis is geography. Geography is the main contributor 
to weak state capacity in the region. The Caribbean and Central America’s proximity to 
the world’s largest consumer of narcotics (the United States) provides the monetary 
incentive for governments and their populations to cooperate. The logic here is that 
colonial history or institutions do not matter; rather, what matters is that these countries 
are within drug trafficking pathways. This structural argument predicts that because of 
states’ geographic region, drug trafficking will remain high and impact states, 
independent of domestic institutional development, and U.S. influence.88  
The third alternate hypothesis is the economy. When the economy is strong, the 
incentive to cooperate, condone, or participate in illicit activities decreases. During the 
1970s, Latin American countries relied on debt-led growth.89 The economic reliance on 
external finance for Latin American countries became a devastating policy during the 
1980s. Faced with hyperinflation, low investment, and increasing uncertainty, many 
people found they could earn money through the increased drug trade in the Caribbean.90 
The logic here is that institutions, geography, and cultural history do not matter regarding 
DTPs; all that matters is the state of the economy. This argument predicts an inverse 
relationship between the economy and drug trafficking, whereby strong economies with 
growth and development should see a decrease in drug trafficking.  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The objective of the research involves a combination of heuristic and theory 
testing case study approach. According to George and Bennett, “heuristic case studies 
inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths.”91 
For this reason, I have selected typical cases, or outliers, such as the Bahamas and 
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Nicaragua, which heuristically can help to identify which variables have allowed those 
countries to have more success against DTOs than their regional neighbors. In this vein, 
Nicaragua and the Bahamas are both heuristic, and they are strong initial tests of the 
argument given their high exposure to drug trafficking pressures. In addition, Haiti and 
Guatemala are juxtaposed as typical cases to depict the effects of having low SC and high 
DTPs on SL status. According to John Gerring, a typical-case method is “most 
representative on whatever causal dimensions are of interest.”92 For this study, Haiti is an 
example of how low SC faltered in the presence of increasing DTPs, resulting in a narco-
state SL status. 
Theory testing case studies “assess the validity and scope conditions of single or 
competing theories.”93 I will test the cases using J. S. Mill’s most-similar testing method 
to determine the differing variables between two sets of countries in the Caribbean and 
Central America. Haiti and the Bahamas are both Caribbean, with predominantly African 
populations, non-Spanish colonies, and island nations, exposing them to similar 
pressures, but with different levels of state legitimacy. In Central America, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua are geographically, culturally, and historically similar, yet they diverge in 
levels of state legitimacy.  
For this research, SC is measured in terms of the World Bank’s aggregate 
governance indicators and SECFOR rates. SECFOR SC is indicative of expected levels 
of violence (homicide rates), clearance rates, and corruption. With consistent DTPs, 
determining differences in SCs between different countries in a region can predict SL 
statuses. SL statuses will be measured according to perceptions recorded from in-country 
surveys.  
The Bahamas use the least-likely case logic to identify SC variables that 
contributed to suppression of DTO activities, despite being subjected to similar 
circumstance as Haiti during the 1970s to 2005. According to John Gerring, the least-
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likely research design looks for a case that “reveals a result that is unexpected in light of 
the causal inference under investigation…a least-likely case is shown to be positive (with 
respect to the predicted outcome).”94 For the Bahamas, I am looking to see why it was 
able to combat DTPs while Haiti could not, therefore resulting in a higher SL status for 
the Bahamian government. Those variables could include different policy choices 
contributing to more SC, increased coordination with U.S. drug enforcement operations, 
or another variable that has allowed it to effectively reduce DTO activities.  
The most-similar case logic is also be used between the countries of Nicaragua 
and Guatemala. According to George and Bennett, the most-similar case design, “aims to 
isolate the difference in the observed outcomes as due to the influence of variance in the 
single independent variable.”95 The independent variable for assessment is state capacity. 
I will look at both countries’ SC during the same timeframes leading up to the drug 
supply route shift from the Caribbean to Central America in the 1990s. Determining the 
SC of each country will assist in explaining how Nicaragua, despite experiencing similar 
economic and political turmoil, is not impacted by DTPs like its neighbors. 
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II. HAITI, THE BAHAMAS, AND THE UNITED STATES 
AS THE WILD CARD 
In February 2016, Haiti’s political crisis came to a boil as President Michel 
Martelly stepped down, leaving the office to be filled by a provisional president.96 The 
political turmoil is a result of violent public “protests and deep public suspicions about 
vote rigging in favor of Martelly’s chosen successor.”97 The October 2015 election is the 
cause for the latest political turmoil. The 54 candidates who ran claim the process was 
riddled with fraud and corruption so that Martelly’s chosen successor would win. The 
public outcry is a display of Haiti’s overall SC deficiencies that were wiped out after the 
2010 earthquake, but really it is a reflection of Haiti’s troubled history. Furthermore, the 
threat of armed violence due to highly inefficient SECFOR, could lead to widespread 
bloodshed reminiscent of the Duvalier regime’s political purges.98  
Conversely, the Bahamas is a country whose SECFOR SC has largely improved 
due to combined anti-narcotics efforts with the United States. The joint task force 
Operation Bahamas, Turks, and Caicos (OPBAT) seized $2.5 million worth of drugs in 
one weekend in September, 2015.99 OPBAT is the epitome of successful SECFOR SC 
working among various agencies to combat drug trafficking in the Bahamas and United 
States. OPBAT also demonstrates the Bahamas’ decision to combat DTPs and improve 
SECFOR SC; this is a break away from its corrupt and troubled smuggling past. 
Drug trafficking is a business, and arguably, the most important aspect when 
determining how to run a business is location. During the 1970s, the Caribbean was the 
main supply route connecting the drug producing countries in South America to the 
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consumers in the United States and Europe.100 The permeable coastlines throughout the 
area allowed DTOs to expand their activities throughout the 1980s. Drug trafficking 
brought additional pressures to the Caribbean that challenged states’ capacities; however, 
not all countries within the geographic drug supply routes have been affected the same 
way.  
Two countries caught in the geographical crosshairs of the drug cartel shipping 
lanes are Haiti and the Bahamas. The two countries are only separated by 531 miles, yet 
their response to increasing DTPs after their entrance into the region in the 1970s–1980s 
has been different. The differences in SC between the two countries account for the 
different SL statuses present today; Haiti is a narco-state, and the Bahamas is a state 
under siege battling to become stable. Prior to the entrance of drugs into the region, 
Haiti’s SL status was vulnerable (low DTP and SC). The influence of increasing DTPs 
and low SC in Haiti’s caused SL to plummet. Haiti rapidly succumbed to the effects of 
drug trafficking as its low SC could not combat increasing DTPs, pushing it from a 
vulnerable SL status to that of a narco-state. Once Haiti’s SL status became a narco-state, 
it served as the drug trafficking window to the Caribbean.  
The question is why is Haiti’s SC unable to combat the effects of increasing DTPs 
while the Bahamas did? I argue that Haiti’s patrimonial, race-based, ideological 
influences have resulted in ineffective institutions and overall low SL. Conversely, the 
Bahamas’ willingness to improve its SECFOR SC, combined with support from the 
United States, results in higher SL.  
In this chapter, I investigate this argument as follows. First, I discuss how Haiti’s 
ideology and institutional influences have resulted in low state capacity. Second, I discuss 
the Bahamas’ troubled past and the decisions that resulted in different SC as compared to 
Haiti. Finally, I compare and explain the divergent levels of state legitimacy between 
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Haiti and the Bahamas as a function of drug trafficking pressures and level of state 
capacity.  
A. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND INSTITUTIONAL LEGACY OF 
HAITI AND THE BAHAMAS 
Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, modern states have come to be 
defined by the historical origins of their institutions. This means that it matters which 
country colonized the modern state, because institutional influences in British versus 
Spanish colonies equates to differences in culture, rule of law, and governance. Among 
the numerous institutional influences Spain brought to Latin America and the Caribbean, 
patrimonialism is arguably one of the most difficult to overcome. Patrimonialism is 
defined as “a form of political domination in which authority rests on the personal and 
bureaucratic power exercised by a royal household, where that power is formally 
arbitrary and under the direct control of the ruler.”101 According to Ben Stavis,  
the limitation of patrimonialism…is that it was inherently unstable, 
tending to be subject to political upheavals, which arose from the 
emergence of rival centers of power. Since historically patrimonial 
systems were usually replaced by further patrimonial systems, their 
existence is seen as a barrier to any sustained economic and social 
transformation.102  
Weber’s definition of patrimonialism also depicts it as “a continuous struggle of the 
central power with various centrifugal powers.”103 Since independence from Spain and 
the birth of the nation state, the centrifugal challengers to central power come in the form 
of non-state actors, such as DTOs.  
The definition and description of patrimonialism helps to explain the incessant 
struggles of many Latin American and Caribbean countries to overcome growth and 
development issues. Moreover, patrimonialism permeates every facet of society and leads 
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to levels of corruption in government that seem insurmountable. Non-state actors, such as 
DTOs, exacerbate the situation by malignantly spreading corruption to benefit their illicit 
activities. Thus, Latin America is plagued by institutional influences that operated on a 
privilege-based system wherein rule of law is superseded by corruption and the highest 
paying bribe. Haiti is a prime example of how patrimonialism corrodes a state. The 
following discussion explores the history of Haiti, the mulatto ideology, Papa Duvalier, 
and the undermining of state capacity. 
B. HAITI BACKGROUND 
Haiti is a victim of its past, and its attempts to break with that past have led to 
repeated revolutions and coups. According to several authors, the cause of the social 
upheaval is related to its colonial and post-independence struggles with race. After the 
Haitian revolution (1791–1803), the newly formed nation dealt with successive 
presidents who used mulatto ideology to govern. The mulatto ideology is based on 
patrimonialism, racism, and self-proclaimed privileges that mulattos presume to own 
based on their genealogy.104 If a person is considered a mulatto, then a certain social 
standing is associated with that label. It is the social standing and privileges that caused 
mulattos to take action to protect their “rights,” while at the same time denying access to 
education and political office for the rest of the population.105 
The mulatto ideology has evolved in three distinct historical stages. The first stage 
is the war of liberation against France that established a “consciousness of identity based 
on race and a sense of a collective mission.”106 The enlightenment’s ideas (nationalism, 
liberty, and reason) motivated the army and ruling elites to revolt, but “the praxis of the 
Black masses in the enterprise of liberation was motivated by an outlook and value 
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system that were recognizably African.”107 Therefore, the first stage of Haiti’s race-based 
ideology is one of confusion; the elites used the enlightenment’s nationalistic tenets to 
mobilize the population, but the different races did not share the same values or ideals 
after the revolution ended.  
A shift in ideology to the second stage occurred with President Jean-Pierre Boyer. 
President Boyer fractured the population who had collaborated to defeat the French by 
agreeing to pay an indemnity to France for lost properties in 1825. Haiti agreed to pay for 
France’s plantations and slave-run business ventures that it lost in the war.108 The 
population felt betrayed and that the indemnity went against everything they had fought 
for during the wars of independence.109  
After Boyer ruptured the Haitian ideology, a long period of “incoherence” ensued 
that resulted in factions being played against one another by the international Great 
Powers (Great Britain, France, and Germany) and from domestic sources as well.110 
Some examples include the acceptance of the Vatican’s Concordant in 1860, which made 
Catholicism the official Haitian religion while “legitimizing the suppression of Voodoo 
and other traditional beliefs.”111 Next, the French education system was imported and 
managed by French teachers. This assured an ideological shift with Haiti’s youth toward 
European-based thinking or logic. The “incoherence” period solidified the rift between 
European-based lineages and customs at the expense of African ones.  
A wave of nationalism authorized by elite nationalist progressives swept through 
the country as they attempted to redefine a Haitian identity. The progressives attempted 
to redefine the myth of origin based on an African identify forged through the revolution 
for independence. In the end, these nationalists kept looking to Europe as the ideal 
template on which to base their identities and institutions (this is very similar to problems 
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in South America’s post-independence political struggles as factions between European 
elitism battled with rural caudillismo). The ideology became an “Afro-Latin enclave in 
the Caribbean.”112 According to Asselin Charles, “the ideological incoherence translated 
into political deliquescence,” and a seemingly permanent fracture between mulattos and 
blacks.113 This fracture is the origin of weak state capacity in Haiti.  
The fracture resulted in constant political turmoil and economic woes that led to a 
series of revolutions from 1843 until 1915. For example, according to Digital History, 
“Haiti had experienced 102 revolts, wars, or coups; only one of the county’s 22 
presidents had served a complete term, and merely four died of natural causes.”114 
Spector explains:  
From 1843 until 1915, Haiti endured thirty-two heads of state. Riviere-
Herard, the mulatto set up by the elite to replace Boyer, was overthrown in 
1844 by the Negro army, instituting Negro control of the presidency for the 
en t i re  period from 1844 until 1915, with the exception of Geffrard, 
Salnave, Boisronde-Canal, and Hippolyte.  Guerriere stayed in power 
eleven months, his successor Pierrot eleven months, Riche less than a year. 
Soulouque, Domingue, Boisronde-Canal, Salomon, Legitime, Alexis, 
Simon, Oreste, Zamor, and Theodore were deposed by revolution; Salnave 
was t ied to a pole and shot; Hippolyte died in office; Leconte was blown up 
in his palace; Auguste died by poison; Simon Sam retired under pressure; and 
Jean Vilbrun Guillaume Sam, the last of the presidents p r io r  to the 
American Intervention in 1915, was torn to pieces by a mob in Port-au-
Prince after murdering one hundred and sixty-seven of his political enemies 
in a prison blood-bath.115  
The revolutions and political turmoil served to further undermine state capacity, which 
culminated when a mob murdered President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam.116 After 72 years of 
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political unrest and the erosion of SC, the U.S. sent Marines to restore order and establish 
political and economic stability.117,  
The invasion by the United States solidified factions as the elite distanced 
themselves from the “New World African, Creole speaking, and Voodoo practicing 
masses,” therefore continuing the erosion of SC.118 Lacking an ideology to rally the 
masses, the elite were forced to the sidelines as the rest of the population resisted the 
occupation through open conflict and guerilla style tactics.119 The elite were content to 
take a backseat as the black masses fought U.S. forces, even though the elite viewed the 
U.S. occupation as a threat, since U.S. infrastructural improvements during the 
occupation offered a stepping-stone for the middle class to rise. For example, the military 
“built major roads, introduced automatic telephones in Port-au-Prince, constructed 
bridges, dredged harbors, erected schools, established clinics, and undertook other 
previously neglected public works.”120 A rising middle class might mobilize and 
overthrow the sociopolitical structure that allowed the mulattos to maintain control over 
the black masses; this is an option the elite found unacceptable.  
Even after the U.S. military occupation in 1915, the elite continued to focus on 
ensuring their social status and political power by denying equality to the masses. The 
mulattos would politically block access to government jobs, mostly due to their literate 
capabilities as compared to the illiterate black masses.121 In addition, blocking access to 
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education became a controlling social tool and strategy to maintain mulatto control and 
power, therefore continuing to undermine SC.122 
1. Norisme, Ideology, and the Building of the Haitian State 
Amidst the confusion and disagreement on a way ahead, Price-Mars published the 
Ainsi parla l’Oncle, which defined the Haitian ideology based on “scientific observation 
of the people’s history, cultural practices, and world view.”123 According to Charles 
Asselin, l’Oncle “reconfigured the Haitian psychospace, provided a sociologically sound 
framework for the construction of a collective identity and self-representation, and 
constructed an ethical framework legitimizing the place of the masses at the center of the 
national ideology.”124 L’Oncle’s ideas were an accepted and accurate depiction 
representing Haitian culture and society.  
The Ainsi parla l’Oncle influenced several writers and three protest movements 
that helped shape the Haitian ideology during the U.S. occupation: Norisme, Marxism, 
and technocratic socialism. Norisme is the most important because it gained traction and 
was actually implemented. Noiriste writers “developed a political theory on the basis of 
their biological, psychological and social ideas.”125 In the 1930s, the writers focused on 
creating an ideology that traced lineages to Africa based on blood, not cultural ties to 
Europe based on colonization and slavery. Noriste writers focused on the importance of 
the masses, the poor, and how they were the pillars of society. These writers argued 
against democracy and liberalism, and they wanted to have a “strong black dictatorship, 
exercised in the interests of the masses.”126 Francois Duvalier borrowed from these ideas 
during the 1946 election. 
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The 1946 election put norisme to the forefront as the state’s ideology, along with 
Duvalier. The noiriste victory allowed for the growth of the middle class, something the 
U.S. occupiers wanted to have happen in order to close the inequality gaps and bring 
about political stability in the area.127 Francois Duvalier saw the middle-class as the 
means to implement his own ideology: Duvalierism.  
The political ideology referred to as Duvalierism is the expression of centuries of 
struggles between Haiti’s colonial social classes.128 In this light, it is a conservative 
ideology that uses the racial tensions between blacks and mulattos as a mobilizing 
factor.129 The ideology ties all of Haiti’s social problems to the historical fracture 
between the mulatto-dominated bourgeoisie and the black middle class attempting to rise 
up from slavery’s shackles.130  
“Papa Doc” Duvalier’s ideology is based on several factors. First, it is pro-black. 
Second, it relies on the elite’s high intellectual, moral, and cultural characteristics to lead 
the nation toward progress and prosperity.131 Furthermore, the elite were required to 
assimilate Haitian identities with Western customs. The elite’s previous focus on 
Europe’s contributions to society at the expense of Africa’s contribution is the source of 
the “Haitian problem.”132 In this light, an entire sector of the population’s ancestral and 
historical linkages is ignored.133 Duvalier sought to quell the racial fractures through his 
pledge to create a government based on national unity instead of race.134  
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2. Duvalier, Ideology, and State Capacity  
How does ideology undermine state capacity? Duvalier’s ideology led to 
economic policies that negated the positive effects from the U.S. occupation and foreign 
aid.135 For example, “Haiti was the only country in the world that did not experience real 
economic growth for most of the 1950s and the 1960s, a period when the world economy 
expanded at its most rapid rate in history.”136 Essentially, Haiti was plagued by archaic 
economic structures from the colonial period; there were no economic institutional 
improvements after independence.137 In turn, this weakened what we consider core state 
functions, such as providing public goods. Without economic relief, Haiti resorted to 
seeking foreign assistance and investment.  
Next, Duvalier advocated a cultural policy that encouraged acceptance of all 
African-based traditions while maintaining an affinity towards European culture as a 
symbol of social status. People who spoke French, practiced European customs, or had 
items from Europe were regarded as in a higher class.138 Despite the emphasis on 
accepting African culture, the middle class became discouraged with the perceived 
European cultural superiority. Additionally, the disenfranchised middle class became a 
threat that was violently repressed; the result is that the U.S. discontinued foreign 
assistance. As the economy slowed and the U.S. avoided intervention, state capacity 
deteriorated, increasing the need for Duvalier’s regime to rely on security forces to 
maintain his position through repression.139 As such, state violence became the vehicle to 
implement Duvalierism, affecting every household. According to Remy, “almost every 
Haitian has had some friend who has been imprisoned or murdered, lost his property or 
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been forced into exile.”140 Once opponents were eliminated, economic woes continued to 
limit the ability of the ideology, and the state associated with it, to move forward.  
Duvalier’s legacy is a country in which institutionalized corruption and personal 
patronage was supported by security forces and the military loyal to his regime.141 The 
patronage system benefited the select few of his regime while the poor masses were left 
to fend for themselves. The situation depleted Haiti’s human capital through human flight 
and brain drain, one of the social and economic indicators used for the FSI and tangible 
evidence of weak governance.142 Papa Doc Duvalier’s violent and corrupt legacy 
continued to plague the country when his son took over.  
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier succeeded his father in 1971 and continued to 
deepen institutional corruption while mismanaging economic development.143 He did 
open the country to foreign businesses, which directly led to an increase of aid from the 
U.S.144 The problem is that Baby Doc and his cronies executed a robust embezzlement 
and corruption scheme that deprived the Haitian people from the foreign aid benefits. For 
example, in 1980 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave Haiti 22 million dollars 
and all but two million of it vanished.145  
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The flamboyant and extravagant spending of Baby Docs’ regime reached a 
boiling point when he married Michele Bennett, a similarly extravagant mulatto whose 
outlandish spending habits in the face of extreme poverty upset the black majority. The 
black majority viewed this marriage as a betrayal of Duvalierism’s black-first ideology 
and saw his spouse as another stage of mulatto domination and influence.146 Along with 
the political discord, socio-economic concerns plagued the country as AIDS became an 
epidemic, corruption skyrocketed, and drug trafficking increased—all while the regime 
continued to suppress dissent in the population through violence and torture.147 The 
population responded by revolting, and this sent Baby Doc fleeing to France on 
February 7, 1986.148  
Baby Doc left behind a country whose institutional state capacity was reduced in 
all aspects except its security forces, which operated on corruption and violence against 
the population it was supposed to protect. Haiti’s corrupt culture and crippling ideologies 
weakened SC to a point where DTOs could infiltrate and run their illicit activities at will. 
Haiti’s low SC combined with increasing DTPs resulting in a narco-state SL status.  
3. The Tsunami of Drug Trafficking Reaches Haiti 
Increased Colombian DTO presence in Haiti is partially the result of successful 
supply-based eradication efforts by the U.S. In response, Colombian producers opened up 
the drug trade to non-Colombians in order to protect their supply-based endeavors from 
U.S. anti-drug assaults.149 Colombian DTOs moved into the Caribbean like a cancerous 
growth, taking root, and then malignantly spreading to destabilize or take advantage of 
already weakened states. The increase in trafficking into Haiti occurred due to external 
pressures from Colombian state-led operations and to business pressures coming from 
Mexico. Haiti became lucrative to Colombians because the Mexican cartels demanded 50 
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percent of the product destined for the United States.150 Therefore, Haiti became the 
transshipment middle-ground for drug producing countries, like Columbia, shipping 
drugs to the U.S. 
Drug trafficking’s influence in Haiti has been a part of its long history. From 
1970–1990, tons of drugs flowed through Haiti, which was used as a logistics stop for 
drugs on route to their final destination into the Dominican Republic or other areas of the 
Caribbean and United States. During this time, the military dictatorships became very 
wealthy and powerful as they were on the Colombian drug cartel (Medellin and Cali) 
payrolls.151 
The military sought additional power, which resulted in a series of coups starting 
with the overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1988. In 1991, they overthrew 
President Jean Bertrand Aristide, who returned to power in 1994 and again in 2000.152 
From 1988–1994, “the military juntas, the police and the irregulars that served the elites 
of Haiti would descend into an orgy of blood letting let loose on a largely unarmed and 
powerless population.”153 The influence of the Colombian drug traffickers came to 
fruition during the political purges by the military and police seeking to exterminate 
Aristide supporters. The government’s attention was focused elsewhere, and this gave the 
Colombian DTOs an opportunity to plan and spread their roots and power over 
society.154 
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The Colombian drug cartels took advantage of the impoverished situation in Haiti 
and encouraged the constant struggle for power, which allowed them to operate their drug 
trade with relative impunity. Figueira claims that the drug lords have armed the slums, 
and in turn, their rural militias are a dominating social force that has wrestled power from 
the oligarchs and traditional elites: politicians, the military, and the police.155 Haiti is 
now a failing state that does not have a single entity wielding a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force. A failing state is an ideal environment for the DTOs to operate at 
will with little to no repercussions for their actions.  
Haiti’s political SC improved under President Préval (May 2006 to May 2011) as 
he sought to build institutions, create conditions for foreign direct investment, and job 
opportunities.156 Furthermore, his administration met IMF debt relief steps, improved 
security through the support of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 
improved the Haitian police force, pledged to establish rule of law, and supported 
cooperation in counternarcotic operations with the U.S.157 The efforts to improve SC 
came to a crashing halt on January 12, 2010 when a 7.0 magnitude earthquake effectively 
destroyed any remaining SC that existed.  
The earthquake shattered what little SC and infrastructure had existed in Haiti. 
Limited building codes resulted in infrastructure not built to withstand a natural disaster 
of such proportions, and many buildings were destroyed.158 The limited institutional 
capacity remaining to respond and provide public goods, in terms of medical care, food 
aid, sanitation, and shelter was quickly overwhelmed.159 The earthquake affected roughly 
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three million people, or one third of the population, and left one million homeless. Due to 
Haiti’s relatively nonexistent SC, a massive international aid response was launched.160  
The international response is indicative of the complete destruction of what 
remained of Haiti’s subtle SC. The UN led relief coordination efforts amongst 
participating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations 
(PVOs), and international government organizations (IGOs). In addition, the UN Security 
Council extended MINUSTAH’s mission to October 2010, and it increased the military 
and police forces to 8,940 and 3,711 respectively.161 Other support includes the various 
Red Cross units from several countries, the Organization of American States (OAS), 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the U.S. DOD, and numerous humanitarian funding efforts.162 
Finally, international financial institutions pledged monetary support for recovery and 
reconstruction efforts while providing debt relief.163 
As I discuss later, both the DTO pressures and weakened state capacity have 
worked to undermine state legitimacy. This has only been exacerbated by the natural 
disasters of earthquakes and deforestation that undermine the necessary strengthening of 
state capacity. As the state lacks legitimacy, Haiti’s democratic future is in question, in 
spite of the resources being placed there by the United Nations (UN). Not all Caribbean 
countries have evolved equally. In the following section, I explore the case of the 
Bahamas, which has a different colonial legacy and higher state capacity than Haiti, but 
still has similar DTPs as Haiti. I illustrate that the Bahamas is a case wherein state 
legitimacy is high precisely because state capacity is able to hold back DTO pressure. 
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C. THE BAHAMAS BACKGROUND 
The Bahamas’ geographic location and natural terrain features afford it a rich 
history of illicit activities going back to the age of piracy in the 1600s and 1700s.164 The 
Bahamas’ 100,000 miles of sea surrounding an archipelago of thousands of islands make 
it an ideal hiding place for anyone not wanting to be detected. These characteristics 
account for a long history of SC attempting to curtail periods of lawlessness and 
increasing illicit activities up through the present day’s battles with drug trafficking. The 
Bahamas’ colonial history under British rule accounts for the difference in SC that has 
enabled it to incessantly combatted illicit activities since the age of piracy.  
1. Colonial SC 
The initial proprietary government (an extractive colony) on the island failed to 
establish law and order for the British colony.165 The inability to establish law and order 
led to a period of renowned piracy and seemingly governmental anarchy. In 1717, the 
British sent a military governor, Captain Woodes Rogers, to establish order, maintain the 
peace, and open the seas for peaceful and economically advantageous trade.166 The 
increased security that the military provided allowed for relative increases in economic 
prosperity; however, the islands’ geographic location and limited arable land made an 
agrarian based economy untenable.167  
Without an agricultural commodity trade, the Bahamas’ relied upon several 
periods of illicit trade to boost its economy. For example, during the American Civil War, 
Nassau was a thriving port for commodity trade for ships avoiding the Union blockade. 
Next, the Prohibition period in the 1920s led to economic prosperity through the illegal 
trafficking of alcohol to the United States. Finally, the drug trafficking routes through the 
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islands have boosted the second economy (the black market) in lieu of tourism’s 
profitability. The “legitimate” government’s primary revenue source is tourism.168 
2. Post-Independence SC 
Even with hundreds of years of relative peace enjoyed under British rule, the 
Bahamas ability to combat illicit activities declined shortly after its independence. The 
Bahamas’ peaceful transition from colonial rule to independence in 1973 was quickly 
overshadowed a decade later by implications of a corrupt and dysfunctional government. 
The timing of the independence occurred exactly when DTPs increased in the region, 
which appears to have had an immediate impact on the Bahamas’ ability to combat rising 
DTPs. For example, in 1983, the Miami Herald published an article called “A Nation for 
Sale: Corruption in the Bahamas.”169  
As a result of the article, a commission convened on December 7, 1983 to look 
into the impacts of drug trafficking on the Bahamas. The report said that drugs were 
readily available and cheap, which resulted in many addicts. In addition, drug-related 
profits were distorting the economy, and the report questioned the ability to suppress the 
trade.170 Furthermore, the level of complicity needed to support drug trafficking became 
apparent. For example, Norman’s Cay was a prominent drug island where smuggling 
occurred by Columbian drug runners on airstrips and in harbors. The population and 
many key leaders were complicit in the activities, which negated interdiction efforts to 
stop the trafficking.171 Although not many Bahamians were traffickers, they were paid to 
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turn a blind eye and allow trafficking to occur.172 Finally, the commission discovered the 
prime minister’s bank account had over five times the official salary for a prime minister 
(PM) between 1977 and 1983—with a $750,000 gift, a $474,000 finder’s fee, $250,000 
from an American benefactor called Barber, and $181,000 from unknown sources.173  
The discovery of the PM’s bank account scandal followed with another large 
scandal involving a Brazilian resort.174 Both scandals led to the collapse of the 
Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). The PLP’s opposition, the conservative Free National 
Movement (FNM), ran on a platform “promising a complete turnaround, the eradication 
of corruption, patronage, and slackness, the replacement of government overspending by 
new investments in the private sector, the revival of tourism, and the creation of more 
jobs.”175 The problem is that the FNM ended up acting the same, despite its proposals for 
change. The FNM’s continued corrupt nature after the PLP indicates another weak state, 
since corruption is a result of weak SC.   
Crime and weak rule of law SC are additional characteristics that derailed the 
Bahamas’ post-independence prospects in the 1980s and 1990s. The typical problems 
associated with weak rule of law SC and increasing crime rates are overcrowded prisons, 
undertrained and underfunded police forces, low conviction rates, and overburdened 
judicial systems. The Bahamas’ faced all of these problems and rising crime rates, 
coupled with an inadequate education system.176 In addition, the conviction rates were 
very dismal. For example, in 1981, there were 1,400 cases brought to court, but only 434 
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persons ended up in prison.177 The abysmal prosecution and conviction rates means that 
if a criminal “commits a crime other than murder, there is a 70% chance he will not be 
caught, and even if he is, there is a long time before he goes to court for trial.”178 All of 
the SC deficiencies the Bahamas faced made it vulnerable to increasing DTPs. The 
Bahamas’ ability to combat increasing DTPs, despite relatively weak SC in some areas, is 
a result of a willingness to change combined with increased cooperation and assistance 
by the United States. Therefore, the Bahamas is proof that a country can go from weak 
SC and high DTPs to a country with improved SC in the long run.  
3. Cooperation with the U.S. and Increasing SECFOR SC 
A willingness to increase SECFOR SC, combined with cooperation with the U.S. 
government’s (USG’s) counter-narcotic agencies, has improved the Bahamas’ SECFOR 
SC. After DTOs took advantage of the Bahamas’ vulnerable post-independence phase, 
the government decided to make SECFOR SC changes. During the 1980s and 1990s, the 
police and defense forces were enlarged and made more professional “through the 
creation of a Police College, the institution of a special drug training course, and the 
expansion of the defense force’s flotilla to a dozen vessels” while simultaneously 
improving relations and cooperation with U.S. agencies.179 The Government of the 
Commonwealth of the Bahamas’ (GCOB) synchronized counternarcotic efforts with the 
USG started with the 1988 UN Drug Convention.  
The main goal of The 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (UN Drug Convention) is to ensure that the member 
nations took “necessary…legislative and administrative measures, in conformity with the 
fundamental provisions of their respective domestic legislative systems.”180 Out of 106 
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nations to ratify, the GCOB was the first to ratify the convention.181 Since ratifying the 
convention, the GCOB has made continuous efforts to meet the plan’s standards. As part 
of those efforts, the GCOB has partnered with USG on counternarcotic initiatives and in 
support via the International Narcotics Control (INC) board. 
In 1998, the INC program worked with the Royal Bahamian Police Force (RBPF) 
to “train RBPF units to conduct sophisticated drug trafficking and money laundering 
investigations, and offers maritime interdiction training to the Royal Bahamian Defense 
Force [RBDF].”182 These efforts are part of a “productive and positive counterdrug 
working relationship”183 And have resulted in several accomplishments: reducing delays 
in criminal cases, improving the RBPF’s Drug Enforcement Unit’s (DEU’s) ability to 
interdict drug shipments and pursue money launders, focusing prosecutorial efforts in the 
attorney general’s office towards money laundering, continued cooperation on extradition 
requests, and focused law enforcement efforts for Operation Bahamas and Turks and 
Caicos (OPBAT). OPBAT is a program “designed to intercept narcotics shipments and 
arrest traffickers in the Turks and Caicos Islands and in the Bahamas.”184 These efforts 
resulted in the arrest of 1,982 drug-related charges and 3.68 metric tons of cocaine 
seizures through the combined efforts of DEU and DEA in 1998.185  
Since 1998, the relationship between the GCOB and the USG has continued to 
remain strong through OPBAT operations. For example, “operations in 2013 resulted in 
the seizure of more cocaine than in the previous three years combined.”186 Continued 
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efforts focus on institutional development, supply reduction, drug abuse awareness, 
demand reduction, treatment, and anti-corruption.187 Of note, the USG assisted with the 
GCOB’s 2012–2016 National Anti-Drug Strategy. The Anti-Drug Strategy’s Urban 
Renewal 2.0 Program is a grassroots policing effort “that seeks to prevent crime, gang 
activity, and drug consumption through directed patrols, community partnerships, and 
after-school programming for youth (similar to Nicaragua’s community programs).”188 
The Urban Renewal Program has increased conviction rates and decreased processing 
times for defendants from 300 days in 2012 to 70 days in 2013.189 
Next, SC continues to improve through the bilateral cooperation efforts via the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), an initiative that contributes to the 
development of regional security capacities.190 The U.S. has contributed $263 million to 
the CBSI since 2010.191 The funding allows for the “RBDF participation in U.S. foreign 
security assistance training programs as well as maritime training programs on topics 
including maritime law enforcement, small boat operations, port security, engineering, 
and maintenance.”192 In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Coast 
Guard, and RBDF conduct professional exchange programs with subject matter experts to 
enable SECFOR SC improvements.193 Therefore, the reasons the Bahamas has had the 
SC to combat increasing DTPs while Haiti has faltered is due to the GCOB’s willingness 
to implement institutional changes to increase the rule of law, SECFOR SC, and continue 
bilateral cooperation efforts with the USG via the CBSI.  
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D. ANALYSIS 
The difference in SC in Haiti and the Bahamas when DTOs entered the region is 
due to the different colonial institutional influences inherited from the Spanish and 
English respectively. Haiti’s institutional and ideological influences led to a country 
whose SC was never high, yet not completely absent. The entrance of narcotics into the 
Caribbean in the 1970s–1980s increased DTPs while simultaneously straining the 
existing SC. According to the FSI, World Bank aggregate governance indicators, and 
CPIA, Haiti is a weak state that could not escape the effects of increasing DTPs once they 
were able to permeate its society in the 1970s and 1980s.194 In fact, SC in Haiti has been 
so low throughout its history that readily available data to measure its SC, in terms of 
governance and SECFOR, did not exist until the mid-1990s (World Bank governance 
indicators start in 1996).195 Collectively, the SC assessments paint a bleak picture where 
Haiti has teetered on the verge of a collapsed state even though President Préval’s 
administration attempted to correct Haiti’s SC deficiencies. The 2010 earthquake 
provided a catalyst by which Haiti’s SC for provision of public goods, rule of law, and 
security was eliminated.196 Since SC in many areas ceased to exist after the earthquake, it 
is expected that the effects of DTPs should have a negative effect on perceived SL. 
The Bahamas’ SC struggled to combat increasing DTPs in the wake of its newly 
acquired independence from England. The difference in the outcomes between Haiti and 
the Bahamas’ SC is that the Bahamas’ demonstrated a willingness to implement 
institutional changes to increase rule of law and SECFOR SC while simultaneously 
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relying on USG support in counternarcotic endeavors. The USG support provided a 
safety net to the Bahamas that allowed it to steadily improve its governance and SECFOR 
SC, therefore allowing its SL to be higher than Haiti’s.  
1. Determining Haiti and the Bahamas’ State Legitimacy Status 
Since my model predicts that DTPs have a negative impact on SL, and SC has a 
positive impact, a nation with insufficient SC to combat the negative impacts will result 
in lower SL than in countries whose SC is higher. In order to determine the effect that 
DTPs have on SL, it is necessary to measure SC variables. SC is measured through 
governance indicators and SECFOR numbers versus the SL, which is measured through 
variables of homicide and clearance rates. Homicide rates are a good indicator of SL 
because a state should exercise a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and higher rates 
of homicide erode this. SL is also measured by in-country surveys that look at perceived 
support for a stable democracy, corruption, and perception of insecurity.  
Since DTPs remained similar for both countries, as SC decreases, homicide rates, 
should increase while clearance rates decrease and visa versa. Therefore, differences in 
their respective SCs allow analysis for which SL status each resides (i.e., narco-state, 
state under siege, vulnerable, and stable). 
2. IV 1: State Capacity as Measured by Governance and Security Force 
Numbers  
State capacity will be measured by two indicators. The first is governance and the 
second are the military and police rates. Collectively, both indicators provide a clear 
picture for measuring SC.  
a. Governance 
Governance SC is measured by the World Banks’ aggregate governance 
indicators. The average percentiles of regional countries are plotted in Figure 2 for 
comparison. The figure offers predictable insight into SL for each country based on what 
percentile a country resides. For example, the United States’ governance percentiles are 
in the highest 25 percent, which predicts a high SL and stable state. The Bahamas’ 
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average percentage is 81.82, which also predicts a stable state SL status like the U.S. In 
contrast, Haiti’s governance percentiles are in the lowest 25 percent with a predictable 
low SL, which makes it a narco-state.197  
 
Figure 2.  Governance Comparisons198 
Since Haiti’s military was disbanded in 1995 due to “a long history of political 
involvement and human rights violations,” its SECFOR SC is solely dependent on 
MINUSTAH. See Figure 3.  
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Figure 3.  Haiti’s SECFOR SC from 2009 to 2016199  
Haiti’s SECFOR SC peaked in 2010 after the response to the earthquake. Since 
then, it has averaged a police rate of 27.32 police per 100,000 citizens.200 Haiti’s military 
rate has averaged 53.94 per 100,000 citizens.201 Comparatively, Figure 4 displays the 
Bahamas SECFOR SC from 2005 to 2016.  
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Figure 4.  Bahamas SECFOR SC from 2005 to 2016202 
In Bahamas, the police rate averaged 707.1 police per 100,000 citizens, and the 
military rate averaged 281.26 from 2005 to 2016. The UN recommends at least 222 
police officers for every 100,000 residents.203 Haiti’s SECFOR SC numbers alone are 
statistically detrimental to effective SC. For example, the average police rate for Haiti 
from 2009 to 2016 is 27.32.204 The Bahamas average police rate is 707.09 from 2005 to 
2016, which is 25.8 times higher than Haiti’s. Having more police per 100,000 citizens is 
predictably a good indicator of a state’s ability to combat criminal activities. Clearance 
rates are also a good indicator of the SECFOR’s effectiveness in those endeavors.  
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E. STATE LEGITIMACY DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Despite the Bahamas’ significant advantage in SECFOR rates, homicide rates 
indicate an anomaly in the relationship between SECFOR SC and lower crime rates. 
Reasonable predictions would assume a higher police rate would result in lower homicide 
rates; however, according to Figure 5, the Bahamas’ average homicide rate is three times 
higher than Haiti’s from 2007 to 2012 (21.38 versus 7.08).205  
Clearance rates can provide insight to the anomaly; however, given the situation 
in Haiti there is a lack of available use of data in terms of clearance, prosecution, and 
incarceration rates. Therefore, comparing the Bahamas’ clearance rate of 56.61 percent to 
the average clearance rates in the America’s is the only measurable indicator of SECFOR 
SC.206 It is expected that with an above average clearance rate, the Bahamas SECFOR 
SC should be relatively effective at combating and deterring crime; however, the data 
shows otherwise. Explanations for the conflicting data may be linked to increasing 
SECFOR SC and DTPs. As the two battle for control or survival, murder rates may rise 
when competing cartels fight for control.  
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Figure 5.  Homicide Rates in Haiti and the Bahamas207 
State legitimacy reflects the interaction between DTPs and SC. DTPs have a 
negative impact on SL, while SC has a positive effect on SL. SC refers to its institutional 
ability to combat the effects of DTPs, and the outcome determines the level of SL 
perceived by its citizens. Additionally, SL is measured by support for stable democracy, 
corruption, and perception of physical security.  
The first SL measurement is support for a stable democracy. Haiti’s support for a 
stable democracy decreased from 89.1 percent in 2006 to 81.8 percent in 2008.208 
Regional comparisons are 81.5 percent for the U.S. and 89.1 percent for Jamaica.209 Not 
surprisingly, Haiti’s support for democracy decreased to 70.4 percent in 2012 as a result 
of the 2010 earthquake’s aftermath, which decimated SC. Regional comparisons for the 
same year are 73.8 percent in Jamaica and 76.4 percent in the United States.210 Haiti’s 
                                                 
207 Adapted from: “UNODC Statistics Database;” “Homicide Rates for Haiti,” Nationmaster, accessed 
June 4, 2016, http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Haiti/Crime#2010.  
208 Mitchell A. Seligson and Dominique Zéphyr, Democratic Values in Haiti, 2006–2008 (Nashville, 
TN: Vanderbilt University, 2008), http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2008/haiti-en.pdf, 16.  
209 Ibid., 17.  
210 Amy Erica Smith, Francois Gélineau, and Mitchell A. Seligson, The Political Culture of 
Democracy in Haiti and in the Americas, 2012 (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 2012), 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/haiti/Haiti_Country_Report_2012_English_Cover_V2_W.pdf, 153.  
 55 
percentage is in the highest percentile quarter (76–100 percent), which places its SL for 
this measurement in the stable-state model.  
Survey data on stable democracy is not available for the Bahamas; however, its 
history of plural political parties since 1953 demonstrates a stable affinity for democracy, 
albeit the degree of which is difficult to measure without survey data.211 In addition, the 
governance indicators from 1996 to 2014 have an average of 81.82 percent.212 The 
Bahamas governance percentage is in the highest percentile quarter, which places its SL 
measurement in the stable-state model.  
The next SL measurement is corruption. Haiti’s perception of corruption went 
from 56.4 percent in 2006–2008 to 66.4 percent in 2012.213 Regional comparisons are 
66.3 percent for the U.S. and 75.2 percent in Jamaica in 2012.214 Haiti’s perception of 
corruption is the lowest in the region according to the LAPOP barometer, which is in 
direct contrast to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). The 
surveyors are “convinced that this perception is telling us more that people are so used to 
corruption in the country that they consider it to be normal.”215 Haiti’s CPI is 94.89 
percent, one of the highest in the world.216 Comparatively, the Bahamas’ CPII went from 
12.5 percent in 2012 to 13.7 percent in 2014.217 Based on these percentages, Haiti’s SL 
for this measurement is in the worst percentile quarter (76–100 percent), which places its 
SL for this measurement in the narco-state status. This measure of PCI for the Bahamas is 
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in the best percentile quarter (0–25 percent), which places its SL for this measurement in 
a stable state status.218  
The third SL measurement is perception of insecurity. Haiti’s measure of 
insecurity expectedly increased from 45.2 percent from 2006–2008 to 51.7 percent in 
2012.219Regional comparisons are 29 percent in Jamaica and 54.7 percent in Mexico in 
2012.220 There is no data available for measurements of insecurity among Bahamian 
citizens; however, the trend in crime rates depicts a likely perceived insecurity that is 
high. For example, murder rates went from 14.3 in 2011 to record setting levels of 32.5 in 
2012. Due to the Bahamas’ much higher crime rate than Haiti, it is safe to place them in 
the lower percentile quarter and in a state under siege SL status (26–50 percent). Haiti’s 
insecurity percentages place it in the vulnerable state SL status (51–75 percent); 
however, a vulnerable state SL status exists when low DTPs coincide with low SC. Haiti 
is clearly under the constant threat of high DTPs and low SC, which has been bolstered 
only through MINISTUHS’ efforts. Therefore, Haiti’s overall SL status is a narco-state.  
Haiti’s legitimacy reflects the relationship between increasing DTPs and low SC 
in terms of government and SECFOR. Despite its perceived stable support for 
democracy, its abysmal governance, rampant corruption, and insecurity are no match for 
consistently high DTPs. The only SC that Haiti can rely upon is the foreign SECFOR SC 
provided by MINISTUH. In this region, foreign assistance can be a game changer for 
enabling SC to get to a point where it can stand on its own.  
The Bahamas’ legitimacy demonstrates the relationship between moderate SC and 
high DTPs in terms of governance and SECFOR. The difference in the Bahamas’ SC 
versus that of Haiti is the willingness to implement institutional change, combined with 
USG assistance, to combat the effects of drug trafficking. The Bahamas acceptance and 
close cooperation with the USG has allowed it to work through its internal SC 
deficiencies that have been plagued by corruption and violence, so that it is able to still 
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maintain a state under siege/ stable SL status. Table 2 summarizes the resulting SL 
statuses for both countries. 
Table 2.   State Legitimacy Outcomes Haiti and the Bahamas 













Case 1 Haiti High Low Low Narco-state 
Case 2 Bahamas High High High Under siege/ 
Stable 
 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Table 3 depicts the relationship between different DTPs and SC levels and the 
corresponding SL statuses.  
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Haiti and the Bahamas are two regional neighbors with geographic and economic 
similarities. Despite the similarities, Haiti does not have the SC to decrease the negative 
effects of DTPs on its SL. Haiti’s ideological and colonial institutional influences have 
resulted in weak SC, which has not improved to a point that effective changes can be 
made. Furthermore, the 2010 earthquake erased any potential improvements in SC, 
resulting in Haiti’s reliance on foreign SECFOR (MINUSTAH). Hopefully, with 
MINUSTAH’s support, it can attempt to rebuild its institutions and hopefully improve its 
SC to combat the effects of DTPs. Until Haiti is able to improve its SC, its SL will 
remain in a narco-state status.  
On the contrary, the Bahamas’ displayed willingness to implement SC changes 
after independence has allowed it to avoid a plight similar to that of Haiti. The Bahamas’ 
improvements to its SECFOR, combined with close cooperation and coordination with 
USG agencies, allows it to effectively combat DTPs. With continued improvements in 
governance and SECFOR, the Bahamas SL should improve from a state under 
siege/stable state to a clearly stable state status. 
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III. NICARAGUA AND GUATEMALA: STATES UNDER SIEGE 
High levels of violence, poverty, and inequality are the characteristics associated 
with Central America. The sociopolitical and economic history of this region helps to 
explain why these characteristics exist, but more importantly, they provide insight into 
why DTOs prefer to operate here (see Table 4).  
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Violence in Central America can be traced back to its colonization by Spanish 
Conquistadores. Violence has continued to influence Central America countries’ 
relatively recent path to democracy too. In the 1960s, revolutionary groups appeared, 
followed by economic crises and political unrest in the 1970s.221 The Northern Triangle 
regimes of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador refused to address their populations’ 
grievances, which resulted in radicalized revolutionary groups and political 
opposition.222 The radicalized groups used extreme violence over the last 50 years to 
further their agenda through the democratization period.223  
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Despite being the poorest country in Central America, Nicaragua still boasts as 
having the lowest crime rates and being the safest country in the region. Army and police 
chiefs describe the “wall of containment” that has limited the flow of drug trafficking and 
kept DTOs out of Nicaragua’s borders.224 In addition, Nicaragua’s decision to improve 
SECFOR capacity through surveillance and interdiction capabilities has contributed to its 
significantly lower crime and drugs transiting it borders.225 According to José Adán 
Silva, “Nicaragua is waging a successful war in the courts, by sea, and on land against 
drug traffickers shipping drugs through Central America to the United States.”226 
Conversely, Nicaragua’s troubled neighbor to the north (Guatemala) had its former 
president, Otto Perez Molina, resign and be arrested in September 2015 for “a corruption 
scandal that gutted his government and plunged the country into a political crisis.”227 In 
addition, Guatemala and the two other Northern Triangle countries have the highest 
murder rates in the world outside of a declared combat zone. Despite the incessant 
violence, the U.S. recently threatened to withhold some of the $750 million aid package 
if the Northern Triangle countries do not make efforts to demilitarize their citizen police 
forces.228 This seems contradictory, since the little security that does exist in Guatemala 
is provided by the military in the face of inefficient, corrupt, and incapable police forces. 
Without improvements to Guatemala’s SECFOR SC, it will continue to fall prey to 
DTPs, extreme crime rates, and rampant corruption.  
The influence of DTPs and SC on SL in Central America produced two countries 
that are under siege. As the drug trafficking supply routes shifted from the Caribbean to 
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Central America in the late 1980s and early 1990s, countries like Guatemala and 
Nicaragua were faced with additional challenges to their state’s capacity. As DTPs 
increased, the differences in SC yield predictable results in terms of SL; low SC yields 
low SL and vice versa. Based on these differences, Guatemala is a state under siege and 
on the brink of becoming a narco-state. Nicaragua is also a state under siege, but it is 
comparatively stronger than Guatemala due to higher SC that is capable of combatting 
DTPs. These differences are reflected in the perceived SL of each population.  
How has Nicaragua’s SC been able to counter increasing DTPs’ negative 
influences on SL while Guatemala has not? Both countries are exposed to the region’s 
geographic, economic, and criminal justice conditions that are common amongst most 
Central American countries. These conditions place the Central American countries in a 
vulnerable position, due to increasing DTPs, when countries do not have the SC to 
respond.  
In this chapter, I discuss how the regional background conditions and DTPs 
impact state legitimacy in Central America. Next, I analyze the two cases (Nicaragua and 
Guatemala) with respect to their independent and dependent variables. I begin with the 
variable of drug trafficking pressure, then look to state capacity, and finish by looking at 
how these variables explain the divergent measures for the dependent variable. Finally, I 
conclude by summarizing the findings of this chapter.  
A. CENTRAL AMERICA CHARACTERISTICS  
Prior to the 1990s, the primary drug route to the United States from South 
America went through the Caribbean.229 However, increasing interdiction of DTO 
activities by the U.S. Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency, and governments of the 
Caribbean caused DTOs to shift their supply routes around 1990 to Mexico and Central 
America.230 The drug supply route shift increased the presence and influence of DTOs 
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and resulted in Central America’s new role as the supply artery for narcotics moving 
north.  
Central America is geographically vulnerable because it is the bridge between 
drug trafficking supplies of South America and the consumer entities Mexico and the 
United States. The term “bridge countries” describes the role Central American countries 
play in the drug trafficking business. Shipments from South America enter Central 
America, Honduras for example, because it is a calculated waypoint needed for refueling 
before final destinations in Mexico or the United States.231 Furthermore, the natural 
terrain of the bridge countries provides cover and concealment for cultivation, storage, 
and shipment of narcotics. The weakened nature of Central American states results in 
vast areas of lawlessness in which law enforcement agencies cannot operate due to 
corruption and capacity deficiencies. In addition, the porous nature of the borders 
between Guatemala, Belize, and Mexico have hundreds of miles of unsecure borders 
enabling DTOs to pick when and where shipments cross undetected. DTOs understand 
the extent of the law’s reach and purposefully operate an additional arm’s length away. 
Understanding this causal relationship explains the shift in trafficking routes from the 
Caribbean to Central America.  
In addition to geographic factors, extreme poverty and inequality create 
vulnerabilities in Central America. Poverty rates are exacerbated by the degree of 
inequality that exists. Central America has high-income inequality wherein the wealthiest 
one tenth earns 25 times more than the poorest one tenth.232 Inequality leads to 
increasing tensions between the elite and impoverished, which is compounded by a 
largely dominant male and unemployed population.233 El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala are the most unequal countries in the world, and they also have the most 
crime.234  
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In addition, unemployment rates contribute to crime. Idle youth are more 
susceptible to exposure to gangs and criminal activities if they do not have jobs.235 This 
trend compounds the economic situation because growth and development will not occur 
where crime is rampant; therefore, unemployment will continue to remain high and more 
people will be influenced by maras (gangs) and DTOs to commit crimes. Furthermore, 
there are roughly one to two million weapons in circulation throughout the region.236 A 
large, unemployed, youthful, male-dominated population combined with an abundance of 
weapons is a recipe for increased crime and violence.237  
Where there is extreme poverty, DTOs provide alternative means to make a living 
as the economic incentives to work for the DTOs outweigh the costs of starving. The 
poverty severity is so dire that wherever someone passes on the opportunity to support 
DTOs, is incarcerated, or killed, someone is always there to replace him or her.238 A 
$15–42 billion a year industry allows for an abundance of cash that DTOs can use to 
bribe officials, recruit local employees and subcontractors, purchase facilities for 
smuggling operations and product storage, and transport drugs.239 According to Bunk 
and Fowler, “Personal economic travails have aligned with the objectives and operations 
of international DTOs.”240 Since economic progress is linked to FDI, but crime and 
corruption deter FDI, it is a helpless situation until the states are able to reduce corruption 
and increase security. Until SC improves, growth and development will continue to falter, 
and the DTOs will continue to spread crime and violence through the ranks of the 
impoverished.  
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Corruption is at the heart of most Central American criminal justice systems’ 
woes. Corruption erodes the state’s ability to uphold its end of the social contract through 
the provision of public goods. In turn, ineffectiveness breeds contempt for official 
processes, as police officers, lawyers, and witnesses watch a defunct system waste away 
the efforts of many people with a simple bribe to the judge or prosecutor.241 DTOs, 
maras, and the elite can feed off a system that exonerates their crimes for the right price. 
DTOs are able to undermine the state’s capacities by putting key officials on their 
payrolls. With an elite population that runs the political decision-making bodies of the 
state, it only takes a few corrupt individuals to prevent institutional change from 
occurring. Unfortunately, there are more than a few corrupt individuals in key positions 
in Central American countries. The result is a group of countries that continue to make 
the conscious decision to have some of the world’s lowest percentages of GDP going to 
security. Until tax reform occurs, the population is not invested to demand performance-
based results for their tax dollars. As it works to their advantages, DTOs are content with 
this situation.  
B. CASE STUDIES 
Nicaragua and Guatemala share many similarities from their recent history after 
independence from Spain in the early 1800s. For instance, both countries fought bitter 
civil wars over political divides between liberal and conservative factions, both were 
ruled by a dictatorship, both transitioned to democracy after extensive civil wars, and 
both are subject to numerous vulnerabilities that plague the Central American region. 
Despite the similarities that Nicaragua and Guatemala share, they both differ greatly in 
their respective SC to combat the effects of DTOs.  
Some authors argue that the role of the SECFOR during the transition to 
democracy after the civil wars explains the difference in SC in Nicaragua and 
Guatemala.242 Another argument is that incessant U.S. intervention in Nicaragua required 
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a strong army and internal security force to prevent a government overthrow by the US-
backed Contras. The last argument is that low SC is a policy choice (Guatemala has the 
lowest tax rates and percentage of GDP that goes towards security SC). I argue that 
Nicaragua’s SECFOR SC is greater than Guatemala’s because of the decisions to 
resource (personnel and equipment backed by U.S.), fund, and implement anti-drug 
policies. Nicaragua’s ability to adapt to high DTP has allowed it to achieve a higher SL 
than Guatemala during similar timeframes.  
C. NICARAGUA BACKGROUND 
Nicaragua’s political rivalries between liberals and conservatives goes back to 
1838 when the Central American Federation collapsed. This also began a long history of 
U.S. intervention in the affairs of Nicaragua as William Walker, a U.S. citizen, took over 
the country and made himself president at the request of liberal leaders.243 In 1909, the 
U.S. supported the conservative revolt that led to a guerilla war from 1912 to 1933. U.S. 
Marines intervened and fought against the liberal guerillas led by General Augusto Cesar 
Sandino, for whom the Sandinistas named themselves under the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN).244 From 1936 to 1979, the Anastasio Somoza family 
dictatorship ruled Nicaragua until their overthrow by the Marxist FSLN.245  
During the FSLN-supported Sandinista regime, U.S. intervention continued to 
influence policy decisions. For instance, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported 
the Contra rebels who were still fighting the Sandinistas from Costa Rica and 
Honduras,246 which led to the 72-hour Document. This document identified the U.S. and 
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the Contras as Nicaragua’s largest threats.247 Fearing a U.S. takeover, the Sandinista 
regime focused on increasing its SC against external and internal threats.  
Combatting the U.S. and Contra threats required increasing the SECFOR SC. The 
Sandinista’s People’s Army (EPS) increased its forces from 5,000 to 250,000 and 
implemented a draft with a mandatory two-year service requirement.248 In addition, Cuba 
and Russia provided advisors and training to improve the capabilities of the greatly 
increased SECFOR.249  
In addition, the Ministry of the Interior (MINT) revamped its efforts to gather 
intelligence and conduct surveillance on potential subversive internal security threats. 
MINT’s efforts focused on developing local intelligence gathering driven by a “vast 
network of informers.”250 The network of informers were called the Sandinista Defense 
Committees (CDS), and they were highly effective at limiting criminal activities, such as 
drug trafficking, petty crime, and the incidents of violence.251  
Finally, the Sandinista Police (PS) was developed to alleviate the National 
Guard’s task to perform police services.252 The PS and CDS combined efforts to focus on 
local-level crime prevention and intervention that resulted in a network of “nearly 1,600 
local committees with more than 12,000 community volunteers working with the 1,500 
                                                 
247 The 72-Hour Document predicted an “inevitable confrontation with the United States, which 
would necessitate the consolidation of Sandinista domestic power with the backing of a large and heavily-
armed Sandinista People’s Army (EPS).” Roger Miranda, and William Ratliff, The Civil War in 
Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 5.  
248 Miranda and Ratliff, The Civil War in Nicaragua. The draft increased the numbers of military aged 
males to roughly 150,000. Kent Norworthy and Tom Barry, Nicaragua: A Country Guide, 2nd ed. 
(Albuquerque: The Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center), 51.  
249 Nicaragua hosted “between 2,500 and 3,000 Cuban and other Soviet-bloc security personnel, and 
an equal number of civilian advisers.” Linda Robinson, Intervention of Neglect: The United States and 
Central America beyond the 1980s (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 15.  
250 U.S. Department of State, Nicaragua’s Interior Ministry: Instrument of Political Consolidation 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), 176.  
251 Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1991), 127.  
252 Robinson, Intervention or Neglect, 12. 
 67 
police [that] created an early warning system.”253 SECFOR SC improvements at the 
national, state, and local-levels designed to combat the external and internal threats to the 
FSLN, proved to be successful deterrents to DTO activities too.  
After the defeat of the communist President Daniel Ortega in the 1990 elections, 
new President Violeta Chamorro began the transition to peace for the country. Despite 
the end of the Sandinista regime’s 11-year rule, the SECFOR enjoyed a favorable 
position, maintaining its power and structure during the transition.254 Divided opposition 
between the Contras and Chamorro’s Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO) party allowed the 
SECFOR to maintain its strength. Furthermore, the contra’s lack of battlefield success did 
not give them bargaining leverage to negotiate favorable terms for the peace transition.255 
Therefore, Chamorro had to compromise and focused on reconciliation that allowed the 
Sandinista controlled SECFOR to “preserve the integrity and core capabilities of the 
effective security apparatus they had created.”256 
The peace transition process institutionalized the SECFOR’s capabilities and 
previous success. The core capabilities of a large army were retained, and the intelligence 
gathering capabilities of MINT were rolled into the creation of the Directorate of Defense 
Information (DID).257 The DID’s increased personnel resources allowed for military and 
internal intelligence gathering. In addition, the national police improved its force through 
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more demanding acceptance criteria, better training, education, and retaining its human 
capital.258 With the SECFOR’s capabilities intact and improved upon, Nicaragua’s ability 
to combat the effects of DTOs amid shared regional vulnerabilities was high.  
The improved capabilities continued through the post-transition years. According 
to José Silva, “Nicaragua is waging a successful war in the courts, by sea, and on land 
against drug traffickers shipping drugs through Central America to the United States.”259 
In fact, Nicaragua’s SECFOR SC makes it the safest country in Central America and a 
model to emulate regarding the fight against drug trafficking and crime.260  
D. GUATEMALA BACKGROUND 
Since its independence from Spain in 1821, military juntas and dictator generals 
mostly ruled Guatemala until the end of the civil war in 1996.261 Whether it is the 
cultural remnants of Spanish patrimonialism, or cauidillismo at its finest, Guatemala’s 
history of leaders used corruption to exploit the population and the military to suppress 
any opposition.262 The long 36-year civil war served to institutionalize the military’s 
corrupt nature and sharpened its skills at repressing internal subversive forces. 
Another similarity that Guatemala shares with Nicaragua is U.S. intervention. In 
1944, a revolution resulted in Communist-supported Jacob Guzman Arbenz becoming the 
president of Guatemala from 1951–1954. President Arbenz was an extreme leftist whose 
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decision to expropriate the United Fruit Company resulted in a U.S.-backed coup that 
overthrew his government. In 1954, CIA-backed rebels overthrew Arbenz’s government, 
which led to 30 years of military rule.263  
The Guatemalan civil war lasted from 1960–1996 as the military-controlled 
government fought against Marxist rebels. During the war, the army masterfully and 
brutally suppressed subversive forces, leading to numerous outcries of human rights 
violations.264 Under Generals Efrain Rios Montt and Humberto Mejia Victores’ 
combined four-year rule, the violence spread throughout the country as the military 
committed genocidal acts against the Mayan populations and made thousands of people 
disappear.265 A testament to Guatemala’s SECFOR SC is the hundreds of thousands of 
deaths of the citizens and rebels who fought the army.266 Over time, the Guatemalan 
SECFOR systematically wore down its enemies so that when the time for democratic 
peace transitions occurred, they held a weighted hand at the bargaining table.  
Guatemala’s military was very influential in the transition to democracy and 
eventual peace accords. The opportunity for democratization came from “the wearing 
down of the military governments, which faced the country’s growing economic 
problems, the erosion of their traditional support from the organized private sector, and 
the beginning of protests from some social sectors, particularly the middle class.”267 In 
                                                 
263 Timelines of History, “Timeline Guatemala.”  
264 According to Timelines of History, “On May 20, 1999 a document was made public that listed the 
execution of the people that disappeared during this period.” Timelines of History, “Timeline Guatemala.” 
Miller reports, in 1981, “The Inter-American Human Rights Commission released a report blaming the 
Guatemalan government for thousands of illegal executions and missing persons in the 1970s, and 
documenting accounts of the slaughter of members of Indian communities.” Talea Miller, “Timeline: 
Guatemala’s Brutal Civil War,” PBS Newshour, March 7, 2011, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/latin_america-jan-june11-timeline_03-07/.  
265 Ibid.  
266 According to Miller, “More than 200,000 people were killed over the course of the 36-year-long 
civil war that began in 1960 and ended with peace accords in 1996. About 83 percent of those killed were 
Mayan, according to a 1999 report written by the U.N.-backed Commission for Historical Clarification 
titled ‘Guatemala: Memory of Silence.’ The report also concluded that the vast majority, 93 percent, of 
human rights violations perpetrated during the conflict were carried out by state forces and military 
groups.” Miller, “Timeline: Guatemala’s Brutal Civil War.”  
267 Antonio Cañas, and Héctor Dada, “Political Transition and Institutionalization in El Salvador,” in 
Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Arnson (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1999), 103.  
 70 
addition, the military faced decreasing political support due to poor economic conditions 
and international outcries at human rights violations and state-directed atrocities.268 
Decreasing legitimacy caused the Guatemalan military to advocate a “controlled process 
of democratization in part to burnish Guatemala’s image in the United States and the 
international community.”269 The 1985 election of President Vinicio Cerezo started the 
democratization process, despite continual coup threats through his presidency and Jorge 
Serrano’s that lead to the peace transition and end of the civil war.270  
The 1996 election of President Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen began the transition to 
peace. President Arzu ordered the paramilitary Civil Self-Defense Patrols to disband, and 
he halted “counterinsurgency operations against leftist guerillas.”271 The Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) rebels had been effectively defeated, 
and they were willing to negotiate terms for a cease-fire to end the 36 year civil war.272  
During the peace negotiations, the military used its bargaining leverage to protect 
its members’ socioeconomic positions. For example, according to Vickers, “negotiations 
over internal security reforms occupied a relatively small amount of time (months), while 
negotiations over a social/economic accord dragged on for more than a year.”273 The 
military members’ socioeconomic standings were threatened by the democratization 
process triggered by their decreasing political support during the civil war.  
The peace negotiation process also preserved the corrupt nature of the SECFOR 
and the impunity enjoyed during the civil war.274 The negotiations resulted in 
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reconciliation terms and conditions that included amnesty for atrocities committed. In 
addition, the negotiations protected the SECFOR’s institution by leaving its personnel 
and capabilities largely intact, therefore perpetuating the rampant corruption in its 
ranks.275 Vickers explains, “the Guatemalan army refused to consider any kind of 
equivalent of the Salvadoran ad hoc commission that reviewed officers’ records. It did 
agree to the creation of a ‘commission to clarify the past’…prohibited from naming 
individuals responsible for abuses.”276 Furthermore, the military’s strength allowed it to 
preserve its impunity through the creation of a special investigation unit called la 
oficinita. La oficinita was designed to aid the governments prosecutorial efforts to try 
military members in civil courts, and it operated under the supervision of former military 
members who simply protected their own and impeded investigations.277 
Corruption continued in the military and police forces. Though military avoided 
the purge of its forces, the accords mandated one-third force reductions. Those forced out 
were typically involved with corruption, narcotics, and human rights abuse charges.278 A 
complicated dynamic occurred where former soldiers conducted illicit activities while 
their former brothers-in-arms operated the newly created National Civilian Police (PNC) 
force. The combination produced a “highly powerful criminal cartel” that easily corrupts 
its former peers and government officials who either participate in or turn a blind-eye to 
the illicit activities.279 
To address rising crime, police reforms under President Arzú incorporated the 
former police force into the newly created PNC. The PNC was led by “officers from the 
old police force, infamous for their corruption, abuse and incompetence.”280 These 
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characteristics contributed to a force abjectly inadequate; moreover, recruit standards 
have been lowered to meet quotas and training requirements decreased, which further 
exacerbated the inadequacy of the force.281 In addition, the PNC creation did not require 
a screening process to vet its recruits.282 This allowed former military members (those 
who were forced out with a mandatory draw down), many who were perpetrators or 
complicit in the human rights violations during the civil war, to infiltrate the PNC 
ranks.283 Therefore, the peace negotiations actually institutionalized corruption and 
incompetence. 
The military’s ability to leverage the terms of the peace accords solidified its 
institutional future by its own terms. Doing so allowed its strengths, along with all of its 
fractural weaknesses, to continue. The institutional SC weaknesses have yielded 
widespread corruption that continues into the post-war era and has effectively negated SC 
to deal with increasing DTPs.  
E. ANALYSIS 
The subtle differences in Nicaragua and Guatemala’s transition to democracy and 
peace have resulted in different SC levels following the wars. Nicaragua’s SECFOR 
dictated the terms of negotiation with the Contras, which resulted in maintaining a highly 
competent force coupled with very capable intelligence services (MINT). In addition, 
Nicaragua’s internal police policies reinforced and improved upon existing capacities that 
were effective before the transition. With the SECFOR’s capabilities intact and improved 
upon, Nicaragua’s ability to combat the effects of DTOs amid shared regional 
vulnerabilities was high. On the contrary, Guatemala’s transition simply institutionalized 
a corrupt, inept, and inefficient SECFOR that has contributed to decreasing SC since the 
peace accords were signed in 1996. 
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Nicaragua and Guatemala’s DTPs increased during the drug trafficking supply 
route transition that started in the 1990s, and they have remained consistent to the present 
day. DTPs have a negative impact on SL; therefore, if a country’s SC is able to maintain 
or overcome those impacts, then SL will be higher than in countries in which the SC 
cannot. To determine the effects that DTPs have on SL it is necessary to look at SC 
variables. The IVs governance and SECFOR numbers versus the state legitimacy 
dependent variables (DVs) of homicide and clearance rates should show a predicable 
relationship. That is, if DTPs are constant or the same in the region, then as SC increases, 
clearance rates should also increase while homicide rates decrease. Clearance rates are an 
indicator of SECFOR SC effectiveness. Therefore, knowing that DTPs increased in the 
region during this timeframe, looking at the SCs of each country can assist in evaluating 
what SL status each country is in (stable, state under siege, narco-state, and vulnerable). 
The following discussion of the independent variables and dependent variable will 
underscore this argument. 
1. IV 1: Drug Trafficking Pressures in Central America: Crime, Gangs, 
and Corruption Rates 
Crime rates are a good indicator of effective SC. That is, as SECFOR or rule of 
law SC improves, criminals should be deterred from committing crimes. Therefore, as SC 
increases, crime rates should lower, and if SL decreases, crime rates rise. DTPs are 
directly related to high crime and violence rates in Central America. The DTOs’ 
migration into the bridge countries has created a caldron for violence as competition for 
territories increased and supply routes became fiercely contested.284 Competition for 
territory and supply routes occurred as cartels, like the Sinaloa and Los Zetas, were 
forced to operate in other areas as a result of Mexican and U.S. drug interdiction efforts 
in the Caribbean.285  
Violence and crime is also linked to street gangs. Central America suffers from a 
proliferation of street gangs due to its proximity to drug trafficking areas, the presence of 
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a youthful majority more apt to engage in violence, and weak state institutional capacities 
to counter illegal activities.286 These characteristics combine with high inequality, 
corruption, and the influence of DTOs to create a socially disruptive force that prevents 
growth and development from occurring. According to Al Valdez, “The connection 
between street and prison gangs and foreign DTOs is strong and will continue to afford 
the opportunity for employment.”287 The lack of economic opportunities and scarceness 
of jobs encourages illegal activities, which serve as alternatives for youths who enter 
gangs.288  
Central America is a region of weak states vulnerable to DTPs. The 
socioeconomic and political characteristics create an environment in which the weakened 
institutions of the state combine with the corrupt nature of the population so that DTOs 
can operate with relative impunity. DTOs increase pressure on SC with higher crime 
rates, more gang activity, and rampant corruption. These traits feed a seemingly endless 
cycle in which the capacity of the state to combat DTOs is undermined through the 
DTOs’ ability to corrupt key political leaders and law enforcement officials. Until Central 
American states create institutional change to increase SC and combat corruption, DTOs 
will continue to take advantage of their weaknesses for their own personal gains. 
Although the above squarely focuses on the variable of DTO pressure, the second 
variable that looks at the changes in state capacity is discussed in the cases analyses.  
2. IV 2: State Capacity: Governance and Security Forces 
State capacity will be measured by two indicators. The first is governance and the 
second are the military and police rates. Collectively, both indicators provide a clear 
picture for measuring SC.  
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a. Governance  
The World Bank’s aggregate governance indicators measure a country’s SC 
across six categories.289 The average percentiles of those categories are plotted in 
Figure 6. The figure foreshadows predictable results for each country’s state model in 
terms of SL. For instance, the governance percentiles for the United States are in the 
highest 25 percent, which would predict a high SL and stable state. On the contrary, Haiti 
is in the lowest 25 percent for governance; it has low SL and is a narco-state. Guatemala 
and Nicaragua hover above a narco-state in the state under siege percentile and their SLs 
should be a reflection of their respective SC’s. SLs are discussed later in the chapter.  
 
Figure 6.  Governance Comparisons290 
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b. Security Forces  
In Guatemala, the PNC is still too small in relation to its population. For example, 
in 2006, Guatemala’s police per 100,000 citizens was 1.56; similarly, Nicaragua’s police 
rate was 1.79.291 The numbers alone are statistically detrimental to effective SC, as the 
“UN recommends that a country employ at least 222 police officers for every 100,000 
residents.”292 In 2014, Guatemala’s police rate is 162, certainly much better than in 2006; 
however, the high homicide rates in the country mean that the larger police force is rather 
ineffective at combating crime. On the contrary, Nicaragua can boast as being one of the 
safest countries in the region (second to Costa Rica), despite being the poorest and also 
has the lowers police force. In 2012, Nicaragua’s police rate was 180, the lowest in the 
region at the time.293  
The second component to SECFOR numbers is the military. Traditionally, Latin 
American countries rely on their militaries to perform internal police functions due to 
ineffective police forces. Nicaragua and Guatemala are no different, as their militaries 
functioned against both external and internal threats leading up to their peace transitions. 
Once the peace transition occurred, military rates expectedly dropped. For example, 
Figure 7 shows the military rates for both countries from 1985 to 2005.294  
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Figure 7.  Military rates for Nicaragua and Guatemala from 1985 to 2005295 
Nicaragua’s military rates were 4.5 times higher than Guatemala’s were in 1985, 
but they have remained lower than Guatemala’s since the peace transition. Nicaragua’s 
peace transition in 1990 shows an expected drop in military rates to 4.93 by 1991. What 
the figure shows is Nicaragua’s comparatively higher SC in terms of military rates prior 
to transition, while Guatemala’s remained relatively steady throughout its 
democratization and transition to peace after the civil war. Since both countries’ military 
rates are relatively similar, SECFOR SC differences are a result of policing effectiveness 
in the face of steady or increasing DTPs. 
F. STATE LEGITIMACY DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Clearance rates explain the significant difference between the two countries’ 
SECFOR SC.296 Maximizing effectiveness and use of resources available is something 
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Nicaragua clearly does better than Guatemala. The differences reflect Nicaragua’s 
retention of a competent and effective SECFOR in contrast to a corrupt and ineffective 
SECFOR in Guatemala after their peace transitions.297 For example, in 2006 Nicaragua’s 
clearance rate was 81 percent, a close second to Costa Rica’s 82 percent (highest in 
Central America).298 Comparatively, Guatemala’s clearance rate was seven percent in 
2000 and dropped to an abysmal two percent in 2005.299  
Guatemala’s poor clearance rates signify ineffective and inadequate capacity, 
which leads to mistrust and does not serve to deter criminal activity. The reputation of 
police and the criminal justice system is measured by their ability to identify suspects and 
prosecute them effectively. Therefore, low clearance rates as a measure of police SC 
effectiveness should equate to higher crime rates.  
Figure 8 depicts the different homicide rates from 1992 to 2012 in Nicaragua and 
Guatemala. Nicaragua has a comparatively much lower homicide rate than Guatemala. 
These numbers are expected as Nicaragua has a more capable SECFOR, based on its 
clearance rates. In addition, Nicaragua’s emphasis on grassroots level intelligence 
collecting and crime prevention makes up for its lack of SECFOR members in relation to 
its neighbors. For example, police forces are assisted by “100,000 volunteers…including 
law and psychology students; 10,000 former gang members, who mentor youths via 
baseball in the barrios; and nearly 4,000 domestic-violence victims, who persuade 
women to speak out.”300 The augmentation of these volunteer programs originated from 
the 1979 revolt against the Somoza dictatorship and refusal to have police like the 
Somozan Guard.301 
Guatemala’s very high homicide rates confirm lower SECFOR SC based on 
clearance rates. Despite Guatemala’s comparative advantage of military force rates, yet 
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similar police force rates with Nicaragua, its homicide rates were 3.5 times greater than 
its neighbor in 2012.302 Therefore, Guatemala’s homicide rate confirms its ineffective 
SECFOR SC.  
 
Figure 8.  Homicide Rates in Nicaragua and Guatemala from 1990 to 2015303 
Where DTPs remained consistent or increased, such as in Guatemala and 
Nicaragua, the differences in SC help to explain the differences in SL. Now that we have 
determined the different SC levels, we can relate those to the perceived SL in each 
country.  
G. MEASURING STATE LEGITIMACY  
SL reflects the interaction between DTPs and SC. DTPs have a negative impact 
on SL, while SC has a positive effect on SL. SC’s ability to combat the effects of DTPs 
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determines the level of SL perceived by its citizens. SL is measured by support for stable 
democracy, corruption, and perception of physical security.  
The first SL measurement is support for a stable democracy, which is is the 
combination of “political legitimacy (defined in terms of support for the system) and 
tolerance toward political opposition.”304 Guatemala’s support for a stable democracy 
improved slightly from 21.2 percent in 2004 to 22.7 percent in 2010.305 Comparatively, 
Nicaragua’s went from 28.3 percent to 29.1 percent in the same period.306 Regional 
comparisons are 25.6 percent for El Salvador, 40.4 percent for the U.S., and 46.6 percent 
for Costa Rica.307 Guatemala’s percentage is in the worst percentile quarter, which places 
its SL for this measurement in the narco-state model. Nicaragua’s support for a stable 
democracy measurement hovers slightly above the narco-state in the state under siege 
state model (26–50 percent).  
The next SL measurement is corruption. Guatemala’s perception of corruption 
increased from 70.5 percent in 2004 to 75.5 percent in 2010.308 Comparatively, 
Nicaragua’s went from 71.9 percent to 67.5 percent respectively.309 Regional 
comparisons are 64.6 percent for El Salvador, 69.9 percent for the U.S., and 78 percent 
for Costa Rica. Based on these percentages, Guatemala’s SL for this measurement is in 
the worst percentile quarter (76–100 percent), which places its SL for this measurement 
in the narco-state model. Nicaragua’s perception of corruption is still in the state under 
siege model (51–75 percent).  
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The third SL measurement is perception of insecurity. Guatemala’s perception of 
insecurity decreased from 45.5 percent in 2004 to 39.9 percent in 2010.310 
Comparatively, Nicaragua’s went from 45v in 2004 to 38.9 percent in 2010.311 Regional 
comparisons are 22.5 percent for the United States, 32.2 percent for Costa Rica, and 49.7 
percent for El Salvador.312 These percentages put both Guatemala’s and Nicaragua’s SL 
for this measurement in the state under siege model (26–50 percent).  
Guatemala’s legitimacy during these periods reflects the relationship between 
increasing DTP and low SC in terms of governance and SECFOR. Despite its perceived 
strength in the SECFOR SC area during the civil war, the underlying corruption and 
ineffectiveness of its SECFOR could not withstand sustained DTPs. The continued and 
institutionalized corruption that followed the peace accords willfully allowed DTOs to 
continue illicit activities to the detriment of the population. The effects of decreasing SC, 
high corruption, and continued, if not increasing DTPs, has resulted in lower state 
legitimacy. Therefore, high DTP combined with low SC results in Guatemala’s overall 
low SL.  
Examining Nicaragua and Guatemala’s SL statuses validates the hypothesis that 
when DTP increases, SL decreases if SC is unable to combat the negative DTP impacts. 
Both countries faced similar geographic, economic, and cultural conditions; therefore, the 
only difference between the two is their SCs. The different SCs resulted in Nicaragua 
having a higher SL than Guatemala. Table 5 summarizes the resulting SL statuses for 
both countries. 
                                                 
310 Azpuru, Political Culture, 73.  
311 Booth, Political Culture of Democracy, 66.  
312 Azpuru, Political Culture, 72.  
 82 
Table 5.   State Legitimacy Outcomes Nicaragua and Guatemala 
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H. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
Nicaragua and Guatemala’s militaries held strong positions at the negotiating 
tables during the transition to democracy/civilian rule. The strong positions allowed the 
SECFOR to remain mostly intact, with the same core personnel and competencies. In 
Nicaragua, the military was supported by a wide base of the population; however, in 
Guatemala, the military’s human rights violations, criminal networking with DTOs, and 
rampant corruption alienated them from the general population. The institutionalization 
of positive characteristics, capabilities, and effectiveness explains the different SCs 
between Nicaragua and Guatemala and their ability to handle DTPs  
A difference between Guatemala and Nicaragua’s SECFOR is the level of 
corruption that permeates the ranks. Nicaragua seemingly has less corruption by its 
officials or linkages to cooperating with DTOs. This seems natural as the FSLN fought 
against the Contras, who were funded by drug trafficking profits via the CIA. 
Guatemalan SECFOR personnel, including very high-ranking officers, are inherently 
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involved in DTO activities and the rampant spread of corruption throughout the country. 
These differences help to explain the differences in SECFOR SC after the peace 
transition and the willingness to combat DTO activities when DTP increased, starting in 
the 1990s and continuing to the present day. In addition, the overall ineffectiveness of 
Guatemala’s SECFOR results in significantly lower clearance rates than Nicaragua. The 
lower clearance rates support the higher homicide rates in Guatemala too.  
This chapter illustrates that drug trafficking pressure, coupled with weak state 
capacity, reduces state legitimacy. In Guatemala, high pressure and weak states have 
undermined the state, and thus the democratic regime following its civil war. In contrast, 
Nicaragua was able to withstand the pressure from drug trafficking because of high state 
capacity, thus bolstering the legitimacy of the state and also the democratic regime that 
controls it. The next and final chapter summarizes these findings and places them in 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Table 6 depicts the historical context for state legitimacy in each of the four 
covered case studies once DTOs entered the region.  
Table 6.   State Legitimacy Outcomes 
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In Haiti, the effects of DTPs and SC on SL is still evident today in all four case 
study countries. Haiti’s dysfunctional political, economic, and institutional SC were once 
again evident in a recent deadly attack on a police headquarters on May 16, 2016. The 
attack occurred in the wake of continued delays for a presidential election to replace 
interim President Jocelerme Privert. Many suspect coup leader and senatorial hopeful 
Guy Philippe as the mastermind behind the attacks.313 Until Haiti can improve its SC 
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deficiencies, it will remain vulnerable to DTPs and its SL will remain low and in a narco-
state status. 
The Bahamas’ SL remains high as evidenced by recent political and SECFOR 
related events. On June 7, 2016, a highly contested referendum concerning constitutional 
reforms occurred peacefully. Despite the outcome, both sides respected the people’s 
decisions, and there was no resulting violence.314 Also on the same day, police forces 
seized 200 pounds of marijuana from a suspected drug dealer in Nassau.315 Both events 
display competent political and SECFOR state capacities that continue to supersede 
competing DTPs. Therefore, the Bahamas’ SL remains high and in a stable status.  
In contrast to the stability in the Bahamas, Nicaragua remains a state under siege. 
The 1980s Contra rebels still exist and are determined to overthrow President Ortega.316 
In addition, the Contras are teaming up with DTOs because they lack the foreign funding 
they received during the 1980s. This subservient alliance between Contra rebels and 
DTOs poses challenges to Nicaragua’s SC as evidenced by recent spells of violence in 
the rural areas that have left “police officers, civilians and soldiers dead.”317 The Contras 
are fighting against the consolidation of power and economic favoritism under President 
Ortega.318 Despite its high SECFOR SC, Nicaragua’s political turmoil could combine 
with economic woes, leading to a situation in which SC is vulnerable to DTPs. Therefore, 
Nicaragua’s SL remains high, but it is in an under siege status. 
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Lastly, Guatemala still faces many variables that keeps its legitimacy in an under 
siege status. One issue is that Guatemala’s political capacity rests with newly elected 
President Jimmy Morales, a former comedian with no prior political experience. 
President Morales has vowed to fight corruption at every level of government, but his 
association with “hardline military figures accused of human rights violations” could 
impede progress.319 In addition, Guatemala faces challenges to its SECFOR with 
continual border disputes with Belize. On April 22, 2016, Guatemala’s army massed 
along the border in response to the shooting death of a 13-year-old boy by Belizean 
troops.320 Finally, Guatemala’s population lacks confidence in the healthcare system to 
combat the Zika virus.321 Roughly 53 percent of people surveyed in Guatemala are not 
confident the government can control the virus.322 All of these variables create additional 
strains on an already tenuous Guatemalan SC, leaving Guatemala vulnerable to DTPs and 
in an under siege SL status. 
This thesis shows that SL is negatively impacted by the independent variable DTP 
and positively affected by the independent variable SC. Variation in SL is due to 
differences in the ability of SC to combat the negative effects of DTPs. That is, when 
DTPs increase, SL decreases if SC is low or weak. The four SL statuses (stable, 
vulnerable, under siege, and narco-state) are a result of the relationship between the IVs, 
wherein the output is dependent upon SC’s strength.  
Since DTPs increased throughout the Caribbean in the 1970s–1980s, and then 
shifted to Central America, their influences affected SL differently as SC strength varied 
in different countries. The four case studies (Haiti, the Bahamas, Nicaragua, and 
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Guatemala) provide numerous reasons why SC differed. Cultural influences, the 
economy, and geography all play a role, but each country’s experience with these 
variables is what has led to differences in SC.  
For instance, Haiti’s low SC is a result of cultural and institutional influences. 
Colonial heritage is a large factor in the accepted high levels of corruption found in 
Spanish colonies. Haiti is no exception, and its affinity for patrimonialism and corruption 
has allowed the mulatto and Duvalierism ideologies to flourish. These influences have 
led to poor policy choices and result in low SC as evidenced by Haiti’s governance and 
SECFOR measurements. Furthermore, the unfortunate earthquake shattered the 
institutional remnants of state capacity, which leaves Haiti vulnerable to DTPs and in a 
narco-state SL status. 
In the case of the Bahamas, it faced similar institutional, geographic, and 
economic influences as Haiti did when DTPs increased during the 1970s–1980s. The 
difference in SC outcomes is due to policy choices that set the Bahamas on a different 
path than its troubled neighbor. For instance, the Bahamas’ early historical battles with 
illicit activities led to the British colonial government implementing policy choices 
resulting in increased SC to counter the negative effects. The struggle to counter the 
effects of illicit activities continued through the post-independence political woes that 
plagued the country amid rampant corruption in the 1980s–1990s. The decisions to 
cooperate with the United States and to improve its SECFOR counternarcotic measures 
has resulted in the Bahamas having a higher SC than Haiti. The Bahamas’ significantly 
higher SECFOR rates and its stable governance percentiles as compared those of Haiti 
allow its SC to support a stable SL status. 
In Central America, regional characteristics, such as high levels of violence, 
poverty, and inequality are coupled with the geographic proximity to South American 
drug producing countries, and this creates vulnerabilities to increasing DTPs. Nicaragua 
and Guatemala are subjected to all of these vulnerabilities, and they shared very similar 
paths to democracy: both gained independence from Spain, were ruled by dictators, and 
fought civil wars. Despite the similarities, Nicaragua’s SC is higher than that of 
Guatemala. 
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Since Nicaragua and Guatemala have similar governance percentiles, differences 
in SECFOR SC account for the perceived different SL statuses. Nicaragua’s higher SC 
compared to Guatemala’s is a result of policy choices by the Nicaraguan government to 
improve SECFOR SC during the transitions to democracy. Nicaragua’s SECFOR SC is 
more efficient and capable than Guatemala’s because of continued improvements and 
support from the Unties States. Both countries are states under siege; however, 
Nicaragua’s SL status means it is closer to a vulnerable state than Guatemala due to its 
higher SC. 
The four case studies prove that SL status is a result of policy choices to improve 
SC (see Table 7 for each case study’s SL status). The research design dispelled 
geographically-based explanations for differences in SC by making comparisons in the 
Caribbean and Central America. Furthermore, economic conditions are ruled out since all 
of the countries experienced similar economic circumstances. The case of Nicaragua 
especially rules out economic factors for low SC as it is the poorest country in Central 
America, yet its SC is higher than that of its neighbors and it is considered the safest. 
Therefore, a country’s SL status is a direct reflection of the decisions it makes to improve 
SC to combat negative DTP effects.  
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